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This dissertation consists of three chapters that examine capital structure determinants as well as 
the evolution of credit rating standards in the market for public debt. 
Chapter 1   This chapter shows that firm fixed effects in panel leverage regressions act as a noisy 
proxy for managerial effects that drive persistence in leverage. Firms that do not change their CEO 
for prolonged periods of time are more likely to keep debt ratios within a narrow bandwidth and 
to display persistent differences in their time-series averages for up to 20 years. A CEO turnover 
is associated with considerable modifications to the financing policy of the firm. Significant capital 
structure changes take place immediately after a new executive takes office and leverage ratios 
remain relatively stable for the remaining tenure of the CEO. Lemmon et. al. (2008) argue that an 
unknown and time invariant factor is driving most of the variation in observed debt ratios, while 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015) find significant time-firm effects and short-lived leverage persistence. 
Capital structure stability at the CEO level introduces heterogeneity in the level of persistence 
across firms and provides a reconciliation of the conflicting evidence in the two studies. 
Chapter 2   This chapter investigates the time-series variation in credit rating standards in the 
public debt market. The average credit rating of U.S. corporations has declined over the last 30 





opposed to any significant deterioration in the average credit quality of rated firms. This study 
finds empirical evidence that casts doubt on the notion that credit rating agencies have become 
more conservative over time. I find that the estimated proxy for rating standards is also capturing 
the effect of mispricing in the equity market as it is correlated to future stock returns. I propose an 
alternative specification of the credit rating model that incorporates the market-based risk 
characteristics of rated firms relative to those of other firms in the economy and argue that it better 
captures the information that credit rating agencies analyze in the rating process. Estimating the 
proxy for rating standards with the alternative model, I find no evidence of conservatism. Instead, 
the secular downward trend in credit ratings is due to changes in the economic climate that increase 
the risk of default. This result is important because changes in rating criteria that do not reflect 
variation in the credit risk of the underlying security undermine the usefulness of credit ratings to 
market participants. The findings of this study assert the consistency and informational value of 
credit ratings in the public market for corporate debt.  
Chapter 3    This study examines what costs and benefits of debt are most important to the 
determination of the optimal capital structure. Prior literature has identified a set of variables that 
help explain the variation in observed leverage ratios. In the context of the dynamic tradeoff model, 
where firms do not immediately adjust to their target leverage ratio due to the presence of 
adjustment costs, some factors will inform the optimal capital structure, while others will cause 
firms to deviate from it. To isolate the variation in leverage due to differences in the target from 
that caused by deviations, I aggregate the data across a dimension that is likely to identify firms 
with similar targets – credit rating category. Estimating the traditional leverage regression on the 
aggregated data reveals size, profitability and tangibility as the most important proxies for the 





firms have lower targets. Further analysis shows that size and profitability proxy for firms with 
lower non-financial risk and the benefits of a better credit rating outweigh the costs of foregone 
tax shields for those firms. Furthermore, while all firm characteristics are highly significant in the 
traditional leverage regression, they can only jointly explain about 20% of the variation in debt 
ratios across firms. On the other hand, the heterogeneity in leverage across rating categories is to 
a much larger extent determined by our proxies as the explanatory power of the model rises to 
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CEO TURNOVERS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE PERSISTENCE 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 The question of what determines firms' capital structures has been a central issue in 
corporate finance research for decades. While academicians still struggle to agree on a single 
theory capable of fully explaining the financing decisions of managers that we observe, the 
notion that leverage ratios remain stable over time has been subject to much less controversy, at 
least until recently. An influential study by Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) (hereafter 
LRZ) highlights the importance of firm fixed effects in panel leverage regressions and calls into 
question the ability of previous empirical models to shed light on the capital structure puzzle by 
pointing out that any traditional leverage regression can explain about a third of the variation in 
the dependent variable, at best.1 The main implication of LRZ's analysis is that researchers 
should concentrate on identifying relatively time-invariant factors capable of explaining the 
cross-sectional variation in leverage.2 
 Although the stability of debt ratios has become more or less a stylized fact in the capital 
structure literature, there are a number of studies that challenge this view.3 A prominent example 
is DeAngelo and Roll (2015) (hereafter DR), who claim that "capital structure stability is the 
exception, not the rule". The authors criticize LRZ's interpretation of significant firm fixed 
                                                          
1 The R2 from a regression of leverage on the conventional set of covariates varies between 18% and 29%. 
2 A number of other studies also argue that leverage is highly persistent: Strebulaev and Yang (2013), 
Baker and Wurgler (2002), Frank and Goyal (2008), Parsons and Titman (2009), Graham, Leary, and 
Roberts (2015), Rauh and Sufi (2011). 





effects in panel regressions as evidence of persistence. While firm-level effects do imply reliable 
differences across firms in their time-series average leverage over all years, they cannot rule out 
changes in the cross-sectional positions of firms that prevail at different times. Nevertheless, DR 
concede that stability does occur but for shorter periods of time. 
 The conflicting evidence on the persistent nature of leverage raises the question of 
whether a "one size fits all" approach is appropriate and implies the possibility of finding 
heterogeneity in the level of capital structure stability across firms. In the present study, I 
investigate an alternative explanation that could be consistent with the opposing views presented 
above. I argue that leverage is stable on the level of the executive at the helm of the firm and not 
on the firm level. Debt ratios are exhibiting persistent behavior throughout the tenure of a CEO, 
and change direction once that officer is replaced.  
 LRZ find that the leverage ratio measured at the very beginning of the firm's public life is 
an important determinant of future ratios, even after controlling for traditional sources of 
variation, a finding which inspired the title of their study.4 I also advocate for going "back to the 
beginning", but I show that it is the beginning of the CEO's term that sets leverage on a relatively 
stable and predictable path.  
 The idea that managerial effects might be behind the firm fixed effect highlighted by 
LRZ stems from the growing literature that emphasizes the role of the CEO as a first-order 
determinant of corporate policies (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Malmendier and Tate, 2005) and 
of capital structure in particular (Malmendier, Tate, and Yan, 2011; Cao and Mauer, 2010; 
Cronqvist, Makhija, and Yonker, 2012; Hutton, 2014; Frank and Goyal, 2007). In fact, Frank and 
Goyal (2007) find that including CEO fixed effects in a leverage regression increases the R2 
                                                          





substantially and cite this as evidence that "most of what they [LRZ] are finding might reflect the 
effect of managerial behavior". The authors then proceed to evaluate the importance of different 
managerial characteristics to the choice of capital structure. In contrast to Frank and Goyal 
(2007), I concentrate exclusively on the effect that executive turnover has on leverage 
persistence. By performing an in-depth investigation of the issue in the context of the empirical 
analysis of LRZ and DR, I aim to provide a natural reconciliation to the results of the two studies 
and definitively show leverage persistence on the CEO level.  
 Furthermore, Frank and Goyal (2007) analyze a sample that spans 11 years of data, from 
1992 to 2003, which makes it impossible to draw any inferences to the long-term stability of 
leverage. DR show that the Compustat database suffers from a short-panel bias that 
overestimates the importance of firm fixed effects for long-horizon firms. The present study 
covers the period from 1975 to 2012 and is thus better equipped to investigate the issue.  
 One of the main findings in LRZ is that the beginning leverage ratio is an important 
determinant of future debt levels. I am able to replicate their results in my sample but I also show 
that the explanatory power of this initial variable is greatly diminished once the initial CEO is 
replaced and that it is further reduced as the number of turnovers in the past increases.5  
 Next, I employ a parametric variance decomposition approach (analysis of covariance) 
and show that while firm fixed effect are able to explain 50% (46.8%) of the variation in 
leverage in a sample of firms with at least 20 (30) years of data, CEO-firm fixed effects account 
for 62.2% (61.9) of it. Furthermore, the model including CEO-firm dummies fits the data 
significantly better as indicated by a F-test of nested models with F-statistics being significant at 
the 1% level. The implication of this result is that firm fixed effects derive their importance from 
being a noisy proxy for CEO-level effects and not the reverse, which mirrors the conclusion 
                                                          





drawn in Frank and Goyal (2007). CEO-firm interactions account for between 25% and 30% of 
the total explained variation in a two-way ANOVA specification including both CEO-firm 
interaction effects and firm fixed effects. This finding is consistent with the variance 
decomposition analysis in DR which shows the importance of time-series variation in leverage 
through the inclusion of firm-decade interaction terms in panel leverage regressions. 
 However, the improvement in R2 caused by managerial fixed effects does not 
conclusively imply that leverage is stable throughout the tenure of an executive. CEO-firm 
dummies might be capturing another source of time-series variation, unrelated to the turnover 
event. I show that this is not the case by constructing a control sample that randomly divides the 
leverage time-series but preserves the number of CEO-firm dummies within each firm. The 
model estimated on the real data performs better in terms of both adjusted R2 and information 
criteria statistics. 
 If capital structure is stable, then a firm's current debt ratio position relative to others 
should be able to consistently predict their relative position in future cross sections. Figure 3 in 
DR shows the diminishing correlation between leverage cross sections over time, which is one of 
the main results the authors cite as evidence of the extent of time-series variation in leverage. I 
find the same pattern in my sample with the average R2 decreasing rapidly as the number of years 
between the cross sections increases. However, when I contrast firms that have experienced a 
turnover at any time between the two cross sections to those that are under the same 
management, I find significantly higher correlations for the latter group.  
 Another important finding in DR is that few firms exhibit stable leverage regimes, 
defined as debt ratios remaining in a narrow range for prolonged periods of time. A fifth of the 





10 consecutive years and only 4.2% do so for 20 consecutive years. I also find few firms that 
keep leverage within a narrow range in my sample, but logit regressions reveal that the 
probability of achieving a stable leverage regime is significantly higher for firms that have been 
under the same management during the period over which the range is measured. 
 DR also investigate migration over the cross section by forming portfolio quartiles based 
on book leverage each year and then tracking firms for the next 20 years, resorting each year. 
The majority of firms appear in at least three different quartiles and one third visit all four at 
some point during the 20-year period. I carry out the same exercise and find that the likelihood of 
portfolio migration is significantly higher for firms that have undergone a change in management 
than for those that have not.  
 I argue that CEOs break the previous pattern in leverage relatively soon after they take 
office by implementing major restructuring to the financial policy of the firm. Once those 
changes have been applied, and debt ratios set at a certain level, major deviations from this initial 
level become infrequent in the following years, contributing to the relative stability in leverage 
that we observe. Two findings support that claim.   
 First, the likelihood of significant changes in the capital structure of a firm is higher 
during the first couple of years after a turnover and is a decreasing function of the number of 
years that an executive spends in office. Thus, a turnover event marks a new direction for the 
firm's financial policy.  
 Second, using the leverage ratio at the first year of the tenure of a new CEO as a proxy 
for their specific target, I show that this variable is the single most important determinant of the 
debt levels throughout this executive's time in office. What is more, after controlling for that 





 The findings above lend support to the claim that the persistent variation in leverage that 
LRZ attribute to a firm-specific unobserved effect is, in fact, caused by a time-invariant factor 
that pertains to the chief executive officer. This explanation is consistent with LRZ's observation 
that leverage stability dates back to before the IPO for domestic public firms and is also present 
in a sample of private firms from the UK. What is more, CEO tenure is relatively short with an 
average (median) value of 9 (7) years, which could be reconciled with the arguments made by 
DR as they find modest tendency for leverage to remain in roughly the same zone over long 
horizons. While manager-level persistence still doesn't answer the question of what drives the 
majority of the variation in leverage, it calls for switching the focus from identifying firm-
specific factors to looking for CEO-specific ones.  
  If we want to shed more light on the capital structure puzzle, a closer look at the possible 
drivers of CEO behavior is necessary. Although a detailed investigation of the determinants of 
this CEO-specific component is beyond the scope of this paper, I do take steps in that direction 
by trying to distinguish between two possible scenarios consistent with my findings. 
 On one hand, the major changes in leverage after a turnover event might be a result of an 
unobserved factor, which is also triggering the CEO replacement itself. For example, if the firm 
is suffering from poor performance and leverage is at inefficient levels, the board might hire a 
new CEO in order to implement a necessary restructuring. Alternatively, executives might have 
personal beliefs and/or interpretations as to what the optimal leverage ratio for the firm should 
be, and, as they act on those beliefs, we observe a change in the capital structure policy following 
a change in the identity of the CEO. I find support for the latter interpretation by first showing 
that the CEO-specific persistence is present even if the executive inherited the firm when it was 





office following the retirement or passing of the previous executive. Presuming that highly 
profitable firms are less likely to be in need of restructuring and that a natural turnover is more 
likely to be an exogenous event, these results lend support to the CEO preference alternative.  
 Furthermore, I track a number of CEOs across different firms and show that the leverage 
at the beginning of the career of an executive is a significant determinant of the capital structure 
of the subsequent firms that they manage. This result is consistent with a vast literature that links 
the identity of the CEO to a number of corporate policy decisions, including the capital structure 
one. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the sample creation 
process and presents the summary statistics for the data. Section 1.3 examines the effect of CEO 
turnovers on the importance of initial leverage as an explanatory factor of future levels. Section 
1.4 describes the results of the variance decomposition of leverage. In Section 1.5, I look at the 
stability of leverage cross sections, stable regimes and portfolio migration. Section 1.6 illustrates 
the importance of CEO-specific leverage and its persistent effect. Section 1.7 differentiates 
between the preference and the need of restructuring stories and Section 1.8 concludes. 
 
1.2 Data  
 The sample consists of all firms in the Standard and Poor's ExecuComp database, which 
provides yearly information on the identity, compensation and other characteristics, for up to five 
top executives in each firm, starting in 1992. 6 In order to identify the CEO each year, I use the 
ceoann variable where available, and then utilize the titleann, becameceo and/or leftofc variables 
                                                          
6 ExecuComp database provides information for the top executives of S&P500, S&P MidCap400, and 





for firm-years that lack information on the former one. Since the database includes an id for each 
executive, I am able to detect the year during which a CEO turnover takes place.7 
 I merge the ExecuComp dataset with the Compustat universe to obtain the yearly firm-
level financial data. I require nonmissing book leverage information and exclude all financial and 
utility firms (primary one digit SIC code of 6 and two-digit SIC code of 49) as well as those with 
values of total assets or sales less than one million dollars. In order to mitigate the effect of 
outliers and incorrectly recorded data, I limit the range of debt ratio to the [0,1] interval, and trim 
all other ratios at the one percent in both tails. 
 The final dataset consists of 47,693 firm-years, representing 2,525 firms and 
encompassing the period from 1975 to 2012. Among those firms, 483 (19.13%) do not 
experience any turnover at all, 896 (35.49%) replace the CEO only once, 627 (24.83%) do so 
twice and the remaining 519 (20.55%) have 3 or more turnovers during their recorded history.  
 All results presented in this study are based on the firm’s book leverage ratio (BLev, 
which is the sum of long-term and short-term debt, divided by total assets) as opposed to its 
market leverage since the former is free of any price reactions to the turnover event that might 
mask the active management of capital structure. I use a conventional set of leverage 
determinants that have been shown to be among the most reliable explanatory factors by Frank 
and Goyal (2009). Those include the following: market to book ratio (MtoB, defined as the ratio 
of market value of assets to total assets), profitability (Profi, calculated as operating income 
before depreciation to total assets), collateral (Collateral, which is the ratio of net property, plant 
and equipment to total assets), size (Size, measured as the natural logarithm of the inflation-
                                                          
7 If the becameceo variable states that an executive takes office after June, I consider the following year 





adjusted level of sales ), and median industry leverage (IndustryLev, calculated as the median of 
total debt to total assets by 49 Fama-French industry classification).8 
 Table 1 shows summary statistics for the primary sample used in this paper alongside 
those for the Compustat universe of firms. The ExecuComp sample consists of firms that are 
larger than the average and median firm found in Compustat, as well as somewhat more 
profitable.9 Nevertheless, the firms in my dataset appear to be a relatively representative sample 
of the population of public firms covered by Compustat.  
 One potential problem with the data is that ExecuComp starts in 1992 and thus I lack 
executive information for some of the firms that are present in Compustat before that time. This 
issue is mitigated to some extent by the fact that the becameceo variable in ExecuComp, which 
identifies the date of initial employment for the CEO, dates back to the 1950s for some 
executives, which allows me to utilize all available data for those firms. However, since this is 
not the case for all firms, there are some observations that have missing CEO data. In those cases 
I assume that the first executive that I know of has been in office during the period for which I 
lack information, but limit the tenure of those CEOs to a maximum of 10 years. By doing so, I 
might be assuming an absence of a turnover when, in fact, there has been one.10 This issue, 
however, does not affect the validity of my findings for a couple of reasons. First, I drop the 
observations with unknown executives from the sample for all tests that do not use the initial 
value of book leverage as an independent variable. Second, in the specifications that do include 
initial leverage on the right-hand side, incorrectly assuming the absence of a turnover in the early 
years of the firm's history will work against me finding any results. 
                                                          
8 The exact definition and calculation of the main variables, including Compustat codes, is provided in the 
appendix. 
9 That is to be expected since the scope of coverage in ExecuComp is limited to relatively larger firms. 





 Table 1.1 also reports the mean and median tenure of CEOs with complete information 
on ExecuComp, as well as of the ones for which I make the assumption described above. The 
two groups have similar tenures, with the average being slightly lower and median slightly larger 
for the latter. Additionally, I examine only the firms for which I have full information from 
ExecuComp and note that the mean (median) number of years in office for the first CEO is 17.2 
(10) years, while it is only 6.6 (6) for the subsequent executives, which implies that initial 
executives in this sample have longer tenure. Taken together, those observations provide 
justification for making the assumption.  
 
1.3 Initial leverage and CEO turnover 
 One of the main results in LRZ, interpreted as indicative of the persistent nature of 
leverage, is that a single initial value has predictive power extending many years into the future, 
even after controlling for observable near-contemporaneous factors. They find that the initial 
level of leverage is one of the most important determinants of the debt ratio, second only to the 
industry median. 
 This holds true in my sample as well. More specifically, I estimate a model that includes 
the initial leverage ratio of the firm, while controlling for the conventional set of determinants. 
The positive and significant coefficient of this variable indicates that there are persistent 
differences in the average debt ratios of firms over time.  
 To gauge the effect of turnovers, I also include an interaction term between the initial 
debt ratio and a dummy variable that takes the value of one for the years after the initial CEO is 
replaced and zero otherwise. I find that a turnover event abates the effect of the initial leverage 





of the initial leverage coefficient decreases even further. Firms exhibit heterogeneity in the 
degree of persistence, which is driven by the frequency of CEO replacements that they 
experience. 
 The results of the specifications below are presented in Table 1.2. 
  
(1)        BLevi,t = β0 + β1*InitialBLevi,0 + β2*Turnoveri,t + β3*Turnoveri,t *InitialBLevi,0 +                     
 ( β4*Blevi,t-1) + β5*Xi,t-1 + νt + εit 
 
(2)        BLevi,t = β0 + β1*InitialBLevi,0 + β2*#Turnoversi,t + β3*#Turnoveri,t *InitialBLevi,0 +               
 ( β4*Blevi,t-1) + β5*Xi,t-1 + νt + εit       
 
where i indexes firms; t indexes years; X is the set of 1-year lagged control variables described in 
Section 1.2 (some of the regressions also include lagged levels of the dependent variable); 
InitialBLevi,0 is firm i’s initial debt ratio, which reflects the first nonmissing observation for book 
leverage in Compustat; Turnoveri,t is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 for the year 
when the initial CEO was replaced and for all subsequent years, and zero otherwise; 
Turnoveri,t*InitialBLev i,0  is an interaction term between the variables InitialBLev and Turnover; 
#Turnoveri,t is counting the number of turnover events in the firm up to year t; 
#Turnoversi,t*InitialBLevi,0  is an interaction term between the variables InitialBLev and 
#Turnovers; ν reflects year fixed effects, and ε is a random error term assumed to be possibly 
heteroskedastic and correlated within firms (Petersen, 2009). To avoid an identity at time zero, I 
drop the first observation for each firm from the regressions.11  
                                                          






 Panel A displays the results of the panel regressions. In the first two columns, I show that 
the main effects with regard to the initial leverage variable reported by LRZ hold in my sample 
as well. Namely, I estimate model (1) suppressing the turnover variable, the interaction term and 
the lagged dependent variable and in Column (2) I add Blevi,t-1 to the set of explanatory 
variables.12 I find a significant and positive coefficient for the InitialBLev variable in both 
models, mirroring LRZ's results. In fact, this independent variable is the most important 
determinant of leverage in the first column and close second to the industry median in the 
second, as measured by the magnitude of the t-statistics. This significance is not eliminated even 
after controlling for the lagged level of leverage, which rules out the possibility that initial 
leverage is just capturing a relatively recent observation. 
  Having established that LRZ's results can be replicated in my sample, I next turn to the 
estimation of the full specifications in order to gauge the effect of CEO replacements on the 
importance of the initial debt ratio variable. In Column (3), I estimate model (1) without the 
lagged book leverage variable and add it back in Column (4). The next two columns repeat this 
procedure for model (2).  The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and significant at the 
1% level in all four cases, indicating that the effect of the initial debt ratio is diminished after the 
initial CEO is replaced and that it keeps decreasing with each additional turnover in the firm. 
Without controlling for the lagged book leverage in the third column, the coefficient on 
InitialBLev drops from 0.332 for the pre-turnover years to 0.153 for the post-turnover ones, a 
54% fall. In the following column, where the model includes BLevi,t-1 as an explanatory variable, 
the difference is even more pronounced - β1 decreases by 60%, from 0.0311 to 0.0123. 
                                                          
12 The model that I estimate in those two columns is therefore: 





Furthermore, each additional turnover is responsible for a 31% (23%) reduction as Column (5) 
(Column (6)) demonstrates. 
 The interpretation of those findings as a consequence of the CEO turnover, however, is 
not necessarily true. It is reasonable to assume that the explanatory power of initial leverage is 
decreasing over time, with or without an executive replacement. This, coupled with the fact that 
the observations following the first CEO replacement are, by definition, further away from the 
initial year and that the number of turnovers is an increasing function of time, could account for 
the negative coefficients on the interaction terms. To distinguish between the two alternative 
explanations, I restrict the sample to only the year before and the year after the initial CEO is 
replaced in the last two columns of this panel. InitialBLev still has a smaller effect for the latter, 
even though the observations are only 1 year apart. In addition to that, I estimate a cross-
sectional version of the two models 7, 9, 11, and 13 years after the initial year, thus perfectly 
controlling for the effect of time on the predictive power of the initial variable. The results are 
presented in Panel B of Table 1.2 and show that, in six out of the eight cases, the interaction 
terms are still significant and negative with magnitudes similar to those found in the panel 
regressions.  
 In summary, I find that the debt ratio measured in the first year of a firm's recorded 
history has an economically significant effect on future levels of leverage, even after controlling 
for the conventional set of determinants. This effect, however, is greatly diminished by a 
replacement of the CEO. There is heterogeneity in the level of persistence among firms, driven 







1.4 Variance decomposition of book leverage 
 Both DR and LRZ employ variance decomposition of leverage. LRZ emphasize the 
importance of the firm-fixed effect relative to the conventional set of capital structure 
determinants in panel ANOVA regressions while DR argue that firm-specific sources of time-
series variation have a nontrivial effect by including firm-decade interaction terms in the model. 
Furthermore, when examining the full Compustat sample against the subsample of firms listed 
for at least 20 years and against a set of 157 firms with 50 or more years of data, DR find a 
nontrivial short-panel problem. With the average firm having 9 or less years of data and leverage 
persistence in the short-run the effect of firm dummies is overestimated for the long-horizon 
firms in the full sample.13 For this reason, I concentrate on the subsamples of firms with at least 
20-year and 30-year histories in this part of the analysis. 
1.4.1. ANOVA analysis 
 The ANOVA framework allows me to decompose the variation in leverage attributable to 
different factors. In Table 1.3, I estimate different specifications where leverage is a function of 
firm fixed effects, year fixed effects and lagged firm characteristics, as well as of CEO-firm 
interaction terms. Reported are the adjusted R2 as well as the fraction of total Type III partial 
sum of squares attributed to each variable.14 Panel A only uses the 134 firms with at least 30 
years of data while Panel B restricts the sample to those with 20-plus years (709 firms).  
 The first five specifications mirror the analysis in LRZ with the implications being 
largely the same. LRZ's main finding is that firm fixed effects alone can explain 60% of the 
variation in book leverage, while the set of time-varying firm characteristics account for only 
                                                          
13 The R2 of a firm-fixed effects only specification is substantially higher for the full sample than for the 
two long-panel subsamples. 
14  The reported values correspond to fractions of the model sum of squares attributable to each particular 





29% of it. This is consistent with the argument that leverage ratios are relatively stable over time. 
Furthermore, the authors show that adding firm dummies to the traditional leverage regression 
more than doubles the explanatory power of the model, underlining the inability of conventional 
leverage determinants to alleviate the concern over heterogeneous intercepts.  
 Looking at Table 1.3, the adjusted R2 in column (1) shows that firm fixed effects account 
for 47% (50%) of the variation in leverage versus the 60% reported in LRZ. This difference is 
due to the short-panel problem of the full Compustat data. In Column (4), I estimate a 
specification with firm characteristics and year dummies that produces an R2 of 15% (19%) and 
augmenting that model with firm-specific dummies in column (5) increases the explanatory 
power of the model by a factor of 3.6 (3). 
 The other three specifications reveal the importance of manager-firm effects. Column (6) 
shows that CEO-firm fixed effects can explain much more of the variation in leverage than firm 
fixed effects. The adjusted R2 of 62% for the former model shows an improvement of 32% 
(24%) in explanatory power. In the last column I estimate a two-way interaction-inclusive model 
with both firm and CEO-firm fixed effects and find that the interaction terms account for 30% 
(25%) of the total explained variation.15  I also perform F-tests of nested models comparing 
specification (1) to (6) and (2) to (7). This approach is also employed by DR to evaluate the 
importance of firm-decade effects.16 In all cases the F-statistic is significant at the 1% level 
indicating that firm dummies are significantly different across CEOs. 
1.4.2. Goodness of fit 
 The CEO-firm and decade-firm effects perform in much the same way, which calls into 
question the interpretation of the former as a managerial effect. It could be the case that CEO-
                                                          
15 It should be noted that around 9% (14%) of the firms in those samples do not experience a turnover and 
thus do not register the CEO-firm effect, which will underestimate the managerial effect. 





firm interactions are proxying for other factors that drive short term persistence in leverage and 
are unrelated to the turnover event. This is why we should be cautious in interpreting the 
increased R2 in a CEO fixed effects regression that Frank and Goyal (2007) find as evidence of 
CEO-level persistence.  
 I investigate whether the time-series variation is indeed driven by turnovers by comparing 
the goodness of fit of the CEO-firm fixed effects model estimated on the actual data to that 
estimated on a simulated control sample. Using OLS regressions, I compare the adjusted R2 and 
the Akaike and Bayesian information criteria (AIC and BIC) which measure the relative quality 
of statistical models. The most important feature that a control sample should possess for a 
meaningful comparison is that it should preserve the number of firm-time interactions within a 
firm. If we break down the history of a firm into shorter pieces, we would naturally expect the 
model to fit better. In section 1.6, I show that the likelihood of significant capital structure 
modifications is decreasing over the term of the CEO. Thus, allowing for time-series variation 
within the tenure of each executive will most likely produce a better R2 but that does not imply 
the absence of CEO-level persistence. Furthermore, AIC and BIC differ in the way they penalize 
for the number of factors in a model with BIC favoring less complex specifications.  
 With that in mind, I form the simulated sample by scrambling the turnover events within 
each firm.17 For example, if a firm has two turnovers over its 30-year history, one in year 13 and 
one in year 19, I will randomly choose two numbers from 1 to 30 and the simulated observation 
will break down its 30-year history into those 3 randomly chosen pieces, while the actual 
observation will break it down into three pieces based on the turnover events. I replicate the 
process 100 times and report the adjusted R2 and the two information criteria resulting from a 
                                                          
17 I drop all firms that do not have a turnover in my sample for this exercise as there will be no difference 





regression of book leverage on CEO-firm fixed effects in Table 1.4. For both subsamples the 
goodness of fit measures are significantly better in the actual sample.18 The difference in R2 is 
3% (1.2%) for firms with 30-plus (20-plus) observations and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. 
 In summary, these findings lend support to the theory that time-series variation within 
firms can be attributed to the executive and that the significant explanatory power of firm-fixed 
effects derives from firm-level dummies acting as a noisy measure of CEO fixed effects. 
 
1.5 Stability of the leverage cross section, stable leverage regimes and quartile 
migration 
 In this section I employ three different tests of leverage stability that are used in DR. I 
show heterogeneity in the level of persistence by adding a turnover dimension to each.  
1.5.1 Stability of the leverage cross section 
 First, DR show that leverage cross sections become increasingly dissimilar as the number 
of years that separates them increases. They report average R2s for cross sections T years apart, 
going 40 years in the future. Due to a shorter panel, I limit T to 20 years but the pattern is clear 
over this time period as well. Figure 1.1 plots mean R2s on the y-axis and time between the cross 
sections (T) on the x-axis. I follow the procedure outlined in DR to generate the plot. 
Specifically, for each calendar year t, I find the cross sectional correlation between leverage in 
year t and leverage in years t+T (T=1,2,3...,20). Thus, there are 36 R2s for cross sections one year 
apart, 35 when they are two years apart and so on, that the average R2 is calculated over. I repeat 
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the same exercise only for firms that have had a CEO turnover between years t and t+T and only 
for those that have been under the same management.   
 Two patterns emerge from Figure 1.1. First, as DR previously find, the ability of current 
leverage cross sections to predict the future relative positions of firms is rapidly decreasing with 
T for all three samples. For the full sample, the average R2 starts at 73.4% when the observations 
are one year apart and falls to 31.2%, 14.9%, and 4.2% when T is 5, 10 and 20 years, 
respectively. While similarities exist, they are short-lived and approach zero over longer 
horizons. This result contradicts LRZ's claim that a firm's initial leverage position relative to 
other firms is preserved for 20-plus years.  
 Additionally, the figure suggests that cross sectional correlations are higher for firms that 
have not changed their CEO. The differences in mean R2s become more pronounced as T 
increases. Table 1.5 reinforces this result. Reported are the average squared correlations for the 
full sample, the turnover sample and the no turnover sample in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Furthermore, I perform a t-test of the difference in the average R2s of the latter two groups and 
the t-statistic reported in the last column indicates significant differences in all cases, except the 
first two. The correlation between leverage cross sections 10 (20) years apart for turnover firms 
is 5.2% (6.2%) lower than that for firms that have kept the same CEO. 
1.5.2 Stable leverage regimes 
 DR also investigate the occurrence of stable leverage regimes - debt ratios within a 
narrow range for a prolong period of time. They find that 21.3% (50.3%) of firms listed for at 
least 20 years keep book leverage within a bandwidth of .05 (.10) for 10 consecutive years and 





my sample. However, I do find significant differences in the probability of having a stable 
leverage regime based on the turnover history of a firm.  
 For each firm-year, I calculate the range of book leverage over the past T years, where T 
is either 10, 15 or 20, and create a dependent indicator variable, which takes the value of 1 if 
range is at most 0.05 or 0.10, depending on the specification. Two independent variables are 
used to gauge the effect of CEO turnover on the probability of a stable leverage regime. The 
Turnoveri,t variable is equal to one if the firm has experienced at least one change in management 
during the period over which the range is measured, and zero otherwise. Columns 1,3,5,7,9, and 
11 of Table 1.6 report the results of this logit regression. In all cases a turnover event is 
associated with decreased probability of keeping leverage within the specified bandwidth for 
prolonged periods. The second independent variable, HHIi,t, is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
proxy that measures the degree of CEO concentration during the previous T years. More 
specifically, I calculate the number of years in office for each of the k executives within the past 








This index will range from 1, in the case of a single CEO, to 1/T if there has been a different 
executive during each of the past T years. With HHIi,t, as an explanatory variable, the remaining 
columns of Table 1.6 show a significant increase in the probability of stable leverage regimes as 
the CEO concentration decreases (i.e. as the index increases).  
1.5.3 Leverage portfolio migration 
 Lastly, I find that firms which have replaced their CEO in the past are more likely to 
migrate across leverage portfolio quartiles. I mirror the procedure outlined in DR and sort firms 





next 20 years, resorting each year. DR show that the ratio of firms that are always in the initial 
leverage quartile is decreasing over the twenty-year period with only 16.6% (7.2%) of firms 
meeting this criteria for 10 (20) years. Table 1.7 presents the results of cross-sectional logit 
regressions in event time (T) with event 0 corresponding to the year of initial sorting. The 
dependent variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has stayed in the initial quartile 
throughout the period ending in event year T. I again use two explanatory variables calculated in 
a similar fashion to those presented in Table 1.6. The only difference is that they are calculated 
over the full period starting in event year 0 and ending in T. Column (1) shows the coefficients 
on the Turnover variable (with t-statistics in column (2)) and the specification in column (3) 
includes the HHI index as an independent variable (with t-statistics in column (4)). There are no 
significant effects in the first 7 years, but starting in event year 8 firms without a turnover and 
with higher CEO concentration are more likely to have migrated to different leverage quartiles in 
the past.  
 In summary, this section reveals three main findings: 1) similarities between leverage 
cross sections decrease rapidly as the number of years between them increases, but are 
significantly stronger for firms that do not change their CEO over this period; 2) The probability 
of observing leverage ratios within a narrow range for prolonged periods of time is greater when 
the firm does not experience a turnover; and 3) migration over leverage quartiles is more likely 
after a CEO is replaced.  
 
1.6 The persistent effect of CEO-specific leverage  
 In this section, I make an argument for a different version of a "back to the beginning" 





tenure to better understand the financing policies that we observe. There are two main findings 
that support this idea: 1) chief executive officers set the capital structure of a firm on a new path 
with changes taking place relatively soon after they assume office; 2) book leverage ratios 
observed at the beginning of a CEO's term are a first-order determinant of future debt levels 
throughout the tenure of that particular executive, but not beyond.  
1.6.1 The timing of significant capital structure changes 
 To the first point, Panel A of Table 1.8 summarizes the results of a regression of the 
absolute value of the change in leverage on three different indicator variables that denote the first 
two years after a turnover and the following two sets of two years in columns (1), (2) and (3), 
respectively. Instead of dummies, the specification in column (4) uses a variable counting the 
number of years that the current executive has spent in office to date. The models in the 
following four columns add firm-level controls (in first-differences) to the models. In the three 
models with dummy variables, only the coefficient on the one indicating the first two years after 
a turnover is statistically significant. Thus, major modifications to the capital structure are 
observed during the first years of an executive's term, but no such effect exists after that initial 
period. Furthermore, as the executive spends more years running the firm, the changes in 
leverage become smaller.  
 As an alternative test, I calculate the amount of variation in book leverage at the firm 
level (measured by the standard deviation of BLev) and, for each firm-year, create an indicator 
variable that equals one if the current leverage ratio is different, in absolute terms, from last 
year's one by more than one standard deviation.19 The results of a logit regression on the same 
set of independent variables are reported in Panel B of Table 1.8 and support the same 
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conclusion. These findings are consistent with the idea of an initial "honeymoon" period, during 
which CEOs have free reign to implement changes, which is then followed by a period of 
organizational inertia (Frank and Goyal, 2007).  
1.6.2 CEO-specific leverage 
 To ascertain the validity of the second claim, that leverage ratios at the beginning of a 
CEO's term can predict future debt levels only throughout the tenure of that particular executive, 
I estimate model (3) below, where I include both the initial value of leverage (InitialBLev) and 
the CEO-specific one (CEOBLev), which is book leverage measured at the end of the first year 
of an executive's term. I exclude from the sample the term of the initial executive. In this 
specification, a positive value for coefficient β2 will signify the persistence in leverage during the 
term of the manager. Furthermore, since the CEOBLev variable is expected to perfectly capture 
the new direction for the capital structure of the firm, it's inclusion in the model should render 
the firm's initial value of leverage completely uninformative. Thus, I also expect the coefficient 
β1 to be 0. 
 
(3)        BLevi,t = β0 + β1*InitialBLevi,0 + β2*CEOBLevi,T*+1  +  β3*Xi,t-1 + νt+εit             
 
 A potential issue with this interpretation, however, is that the CEO-specific leverage is an 
observation closer in time to the debt ratios explained by the model, whereas, the InitialBLev 
variable is an observation further away in the past. As shown in the previous section, the 
predictive power of this single initial variable decreases with time and, thus, it is possible that the 
more recent observation is simply capturing the effect of the initial one, as opposed to signifying 





perform the following exercise. I isolate the sample of firms that never change their chief 
executive officer in my sample and the firm-years during the term of the first CEO of those that 
do, provided that they have at least 10 annual observations. Each firm in that subsample is then 
matched based on the length of its history to the subsample of turnover firms.20 Since the no 
turnover dataset includes only 450 firms, this produces a large number of matches for each of 
those firms. I randomly select one of the turnover firms and assign its actual CEO replacement 
profile to the no turnover firm, thus creating a simulated, or "false", set of turnovers. I repeat this 
exercise 100 times, measuring the CEO-specific leverage in the first year after the simulated 
replacement and estimate model (4).  
 If the executive specific variable has an effect only due to its recency, I expect to find the 
same result for the simulated and actual samples. If, however, the importance of the CEO-
specific leverage stems from the actions taken by the new executive, then the coefficient on the 
initial book leverage should preserve its significance in the false sample but lose it in the real 
data. Thus, I expect InitiaBLev to have a positive and significant coefficient in model (4), even 
after controlling for the more recent CEOBLevFalse observation. 
 
(4)       BLevi,t = β0 + β1*InitialBLevi,0 + β2*CEOBLevFalsei,T*false+1  +  β3*Xi,t-1 + νt+εit                   
 
The estimation results of the two models are reported in Panel A of Table 1.9 where columns (1) 
and (2) contain the estimates from model (3) on the actual turnover sample while columns (3) 
and (4) present the findings based on model (4), estimated on the simulated control sample. 
                                                          





 In both cases the book leverage at the inception of the firm has a highly significant effect 
without controlling for the CEO-specific covariate although the magnitude of the coefficient is, 
as expected, significantly larger in the simulated, non-turnover sample. In column (2) and (4), the 
CEO-specific leverage is added to a regression that already accounts for the firm-specific initial 
one and we see the adjusted R2 increasing by 94.2% in the actual turnover sample versus 56.09% 
in the simulated one. What is more, controlling for the CEO-specific factor renders the firm-
specific initial debt ratio completely insignificant for firm-years where the initial CEO is actually 
replaced, while that is not the case in the simulated turnover sample.  
 In summary, I find that during the tenure of the initial CEO, the debt ratio measured at 
the start of the firm's history is a first-order determinant of future leverage, but it is no longer 
important after that CEO is replaced. Instead, the new executives set the firm on a different path 
immediately after they take office and do not alter the debt ratio significantly in the subsequent 
years.  
 
1.7 What Drives the CEO-level Persistence? 
 Although identifying the exact reasons behind the importance of the CEO effect is 
beyond the scope of this paper, I take steps to distinguish between two alternative explanations 
consistent with the findings of this study. One possibility is that there exist unobserved factors 
driving both the replacement of the executive and the change in the financing policy of the firm. 
On the other hand, the growing literature on behavioral finance would suggest that CEOs alter 
the capital structure of the firm for reasons that are specific to the identity of the person. I 





 Denis and Denis (1995), and Huson et.al. (2004) show that forced replacements of top 
management occur after periods of poor performance and are followed by significant 
restructuring of the firm leading to increased profitability. Drawing from those studies, I assume 
that turnovers that occur naturally, as opposed to forced ones, are more likely to be an exogenous 
event and not correlated with any unobserved firm characteristics that might necessitate a capital 
structure modification. I identify natural turnovers in two ways: 1) using the ExecuComp 
variable reason that provides the reason for an executive's departure from the firm as well as the 
variable age, where available21; and 2) identifying managers that inherit the firm after it has been 
in the top quartile in terms of industry-adjusted profitability during the year right before the 
turnover. Equipped with those subsamples, I estimate model (3) and report the results in Panel B 
of Table 1.9. The sample in the first two columns is limited to observations under the term of a 
CEOs that took office after their predecessors retired or passed away, as indicated by the variable 
reason, or if the age of the predecessor was 70 years or older. In columns (3) and (4), I only 
include observations where the manager took office following a year of exceptionally good 
performance. 
 In the context of this regression model, the two competing explanations have different 
implications. If the CEO-effect is due to a missing factor driving both the capital structure 
change and the replacement, then controlling for manager-specific leverage should not affect the 
significance of the initial debt ratio variable in the samples of natural turnovers. On the other 
hand, if the managerial effect is specific to the identity of the executive, a change in the capital 
structure will be seen even when it is not necessitated by the poor performance of the firm. In 
that case, the firm's initial leverage should lose all its predictive power once we control for the 
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CEO-specific one. As we can see from Table 1.9, controlling for the CEOBLev variable renders 
the firm-specific leverage insignificant in both subsamples, showing support for a CEO-
preferences story. 
 As a final test of the two competing claims, I employ an approach similar to Bertrand and 
Schoar (2003) who examine a manager-firm panel dataset tracking the top managers across 
firms. The authors find that manager fixed effects are a significant factor in this setting that helps 
explain the firm's investment and financial policy, as well as its organizational strategy and 
performance. 
 I modify this approach in the following way. First, I track the chief executive officers 
across firms and can identify 161 CEOs that switch firms, with 8 managing three different firms 
during their ExecuComp history. I identify the level of leverage during the first year of their 
career in the sample (i.e. during their first year in the initial firm that they run) and call this 
variable ExecutiveInitialBLev. This is equivalent to the CEOBLev variable of model (3) if I 
examine the initial firm and thus should have great importance for the future leverage ratio 
during that CEO's tenure in the first firm as indicated by the prior results.  
 The ExecutiveInitialBLev variable, however, should not be able to explain the leverage of 
the subsequent firms under this CEO's management unless the significance of the manager fixed 
effects is due to factors attributable to the identity of that executive.  
 To test this hypothesis, I estimate the following specifications on firm-year panel data 
that consists only of the observations under the management of CEOs that switch firms, 
excluding the initial firm that they run.22 
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(5)        BLevi,t = β0 + β1*InitialBLevi,0 + β2*ExecutiveInitialBLevj,0  +  β3*Xi,t-1 + νt+εit     
 
 Table 1.10 presents the results of estimating four different specifications of this model. 
Column (1) only uses the ExecutiveInitialBLev as explanatory variable and column (2) adds the 
firm initial book leverage to the model with the remaining two columns also controlling for 
lagged firm-specific characteristics. In all specifications, the coefficient on the 
ExecutiveInitialBLev is significantly related to the debt ratio of the firm. Thus, it is most likely 
the case that managers have their individual preferences in terms capital structure and impose 
those preferences on the firm they manage. 
 This finding is consistent with a number of studies in the behavioral finance literature that 
relate CEO personal characteristics to the financial policy of the firms that they manage. 
Cronqvist, Makhija and Yonker (2012) relate the CEOs' personal leverage (choice of mortgage 
in their most recent primary home purchases) to the leverage ratio of the firm they work for and 
find a positive and significant relationship both in a cross-sectional analysis and when 
investigating CEO turnovers. Cao and Mauer (2010) focus on significant changes in debt policy - 
when the firm switches from zero to positive debt and vice versa - and show that CEO turnover, 




 The frequency of managerial turnover within a firm is a first-order determinant of the 
level of leverage persistence. Capital structure stability at the executive's level seems to be 





contradict DR's finding of significant within firm variation in leverage as the average (median) 
tenure of CEOs is relatively short.  
 Firms that do not change their CEO for prolonged periods of time are more likely to keep 
debt ratios within a narrow bandwidth and to display persistent differences in their time-series 
averages for up to 20 years. 
 A replacement of the person at the helm of the firm is followed by a significant 
modification to the capital structure of the firm, taking place in the beginning of the term of the 
new executive. After the initial restructuring, the CEO refrains from implementing any 
significant alterations. 
  The executive turnover and the change in capital structure do not appear to be 
simultaneously driven by an unobserved factor. Instead, it is the identity of the CEO, and perhaps 
their personal preferences, that affect the financial policy of the firm. Thus, the heterogeneity of 
managerial styles, coupled with the length of the CEOs' tenure might help explain both the cross-
sectional variation in leverage and the relative stability of capital structures over time. 
 Further examination of the determinants of executive behavior and decision making 
process will help us achieve better understanding of the complexities of capital structure 
determination. Such analysis is beyond the scope of this paper and poses an interesting question 














The table presents summary statistics (averages, medians, and standard deviations) for the Compustat sample that encompasses all 
nonfinancial firms in the Compustat yearly files during the 1975 - 2012 period, and for the ExecuComp sample that consists of all 
nonfinancial firms in the ExecuComp database. Also shown are the average and median tenure for the chief executive officers in the 
sample.  Unknown CEOs are the firm-year observations for which I cannot identify the executive of the firm due to the fact that the 
sample period starts in 1975 and for some firms the CEO information available in ExecuComp starts at a later date. Variable 





Variable Obs. Mean Median St. Dev.   Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Book leverage      182,666  0.26 0.22 0.22 
 
       47,693  0.22 0.20 0.19 
Market-to-book      153,605  1.75 1.31 1.29 
 
       44,979  1.92 1.51 1.26 
Profitability      164,074  0.12 0.13 0.17 
 
       45,328  0.17 0.16 0.13 
Size      182,666  4.27 4.20 2.15 
 
       47,693  6.03 6.01 1.82 
Tangibility      182,412  0.30 0.24 0.23 
 
       47,597  0.31 0.25 0.22 
Median industry book leverage      182,666  0.22 0.24 0.10 
 
       47,693  0.21 0.23 0.10 
          CEO tenure 
     
4,894 8.61 7.00 7.40 
Unknown CEO tenure 
     
1,596 6.89 9.00 3.50 



















Turnovers and the effect of initial leverage 
The table presents the results of OLS regression of book leverage on the firm's initial leverage ratio (the first nonmissing book 
leverage observation in the sample) and a set of control variables (columns 1 and 2) as well as interaction terms between the initial 
leverage ratio and an indicator variable (Turnoveri,t) that takes the value of 1 for firm i in year t if the firm has experienced a turnover 
by year t, and zero otherwise (columns 3 and 4). In columns 5 and 6, the Turnoveri,t dummy variable is substituted with  #Turnoversi,t 
which counts the number of turnover events for firm i up to and including year t. Panel A reports the results of panel regression, while 
Panel B shows estimates of the model estimated cross-sectionally in event time with event being defined as the number of years since 
the initial year of each firm. The Full Sample consists of all nonfinancial firms in the ExecuComp database with financial data on 
Compustat from 1975 to 2012. The data used in the last two columns is limited to only the year before and the year after the first 
turnover for those firms that did change their executive officer. All specifications account for calendar year fixed effects and the 
standard errors used to compute t-statistics (the latter reported in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level. The first observation is omitted to avoid identity at time 0 as well as the second observation for the specifications including 
lagged book leverage as an independent variable. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level are 




































































(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 





-0.0504* -0.0474*  
   
[-8.88] [-3.71] 
  
[-2.31] [-2.49]    




0.0142* 0.00880   
   
[9.48] [4.30] 
  
[2.25] [1.70]    
         #Turni,t*Initial Blevi,0 
   
-0.0963** -0.0101** 
 
                
     
[-8.78] [-3.84] 
 
                
         #Turnoversi,t 
    
0.0322** 0.00432** 
 
                
     
[9.11] [4.99] 
 
                
         Initial Blevi,0 0.226** 0.0193** 0.332** 0.0311** 0.312** 0.0293** 0.279** 0.0462** 
 
[17.66] [6.82] [19.34] [7.50] [19.91] [7.92] [11.55] [3.27]    
















[60.81]    
         MtoB i,t-1 -0.0134** -0.00100 -0.0134** -0.00100 -0.0132** -0.000964 -0.0159** -0.00175 
 
[-7.72] [-1.80] [-7.75] [-1.81] [-7.59] [-1.74] [-5.13] [-1.11]    
Profi i,t-1 -0.194** -0.0220** -0.192** -0.0220** -0.191** -0.0217** -0.185** -0.0289   
 
[-12.47] [-4.14] [-12.39] [-4.13] [-12.33] [-4.07] [-5.78] [-1.91]    
Collateral i,t-1 0.0798** 0.0136** 0.0787** 0.0136** 0.0797** 0.0138** 0.0945** 0.0199*  
 
[6.80] [5.33] [6.77] [5.30] [6.83] [5.35] [5.18] [2.32]    
Size i,t-1 0.0131** 0.00197** 0.0121** 0.00182** 0.0116** 0.00170** 0.0113** 0.00127 
 
[10.09] [6.70] [9.11] [5.92] [8.66] [5.48] [5.26] [1.25]    
IndustryLev i,t-1 0.372** 0.0606** 0.367** 0.0605** 0.365** 0.0604** 0.362** 0.0944** 
 
[13.49] [9.89] [13.50] [9.89] [13.43] [9.85] [7.82] [4.32]    
_cons 0.0270** 0.00445 0.00778 0.00262 0.0156 0.00379 -0.00113 0.00972 
 
[2.15] [1.01] [0.63] [0.59] [1.26] [0.85] [-0.02] [0.33]    
         Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
           
41,419  
           
40,527  
           
41,419  
           
40,527  
           
41,419  
           
40,527  
             
3,377  
             
3,377  







Panel B: Cross-sectional Regressions in Event Time 
  
Initial + 7 
years  
Initial + 9 
years  
Initial + 11 
years  
Initial + 13 
years  
Initial + 7 
years  
Initial + 9 
years  
Initial + 11 
years  
Initial + 13 
years  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
         Turni,t*   Initial 
Blevi,0 -0.105** -0.135** -0.0601 -0.0850 
   
                
 
[-2.74] [-3.75] [-1.34] [-1.78] 
   
                
         Turnoveri,t 0.0319** 0.0389** 0.0231 0.0412** 
   
                
 
[2.82] [3.57] [1.65] [2.72] 
   
                
         #Turni,t* Initial 
Blevi,0 
    
-0.0860** -0.0803** -0.0543 -0.0428 
     
[-2.73] [-2.98] [-1.88] [-1.61]    
         #Turnoversi,t 
    
0.0282** 0.0249** 0.0208* 0.0205*  
     
[2.92] [2.89] [2.22] [2.13]    
         Initial Blevi,0 0.316** 0.271** 0.260** 0.260** 0.313** 0.255** 0.263** 0.235** 
 
[14.08] [11.11] [6.69] [6.04] [14.20] [10.85] [8.09] [6.79]    
         MtoB i,t-1 -0.0140** -0.0150** -0.00082 -0.00826 -0.0139** -0.0150** -0.000697 -0.0082 
 
[-3.89] [-3.50] [-0.16] [-1.58] [-3.87] [-3.52] [-0.14] [-1.57]    
Profi i,t-1 -0.227** -0.219** -0.303** -0.262** -0.228** -0.220** -0.301** -0.260** 
 
[-7.91] [-5.58] [-6.41] [-4.83] [-7.94] [-5.63] [-6.35] [-4.81]    
Collateral i,t-1 0.103** 0.0968** 0.108** 0.0805** 0.103** 0.0968** 0.108** 0.0794** 
 
[5.33] [4.89] [5.25] [3.96] [5.34] [4.88] [5.20] [3.91]    
Size i,t-1 0.00978** 0.0105** 0.0122** 0.0130** 0.00971** 0.0104** 0.0120** 0.0132** 
 
[4.23] [4.38] [4.87] [5.02] [4.20] [4.31] [4.83] [5.07]    
IndustryLevi,t-1 0.375** 0.337** 0.420** 0.380** 0.374** 0.336** 0.424** 0.385** 
 
[8.08] [7.04] [8.18] [7.61] [8.07] [7.03] [8.22] [7.69]    
_cons 0.0266 0.0193 -0.000986 0.0173 0.0279 0.0255 -0.00109 0.0273 
 
[1.34] [0.93] [-0.04] [0.68] [1.40] [1.24] [-0.05] [1.13]    
         Year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 
           
2,178  
           
2,066  
           
1,879  
           
1,757  
           
2,178  
           
2,066  
           
1,879  
           
1,757  










Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) of book leverage 
The table presents variance decomposition of book leverage. The sample spans the 1975-2012 period but excludes the 
firm-years for which I lack definite CEO data. The adjusted R2 is reported for eight different specifications of the 
model. In each column, I report the Type III partial sum of squares for each variable in the model scaled by the total 
explained variation (the sum of Type III partial sum of squares across all factors).  also reported are F-statistics testing 
the hypothesis that model 1, which includes firm dummies is indistinguishable from model 6, which allows for the firm 
fixed effects to vary across the firm's CEOs. The same test is performed for models 3 and 7, which add calendar year 
dummies to models 1 and 6, respectively. All F-statistics indicate significant differences between the nested models at 
the 1% level.  
Panel A. Firms with at least 30 years of data 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         CEO-firm fixed effects - - - - - 1 0.98 0.30 
Firm fixed effects 1 - 0.98 - 0.92 - - 0.68 
Year fixed effect - 1 0.02 0.14 0.03 - 0.02 0.02 
MtoB i,t-1 - - - 0.18 0.01 - - - 
Profi i,t-1 - - - 0.22 0.01 - - - 
Collateral i,t-1 - - - 0.12 0.01 - - - 
Size i,t-1 - - - 0.03 0.01 - - - 
IndustryLevi,t-1 - - - 0.30 0.01 - - - 
Adj. R2 46.79% 0.60% 47.59% 14.70% 53.54% 61.90% 63.02% 63.02% 
         F-stat 1 vs 6 8.25 
       F-stat 3 vs 7 8.57               
         
         Panel B. Firms with at least 20 years of data 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         CEO-firm fixed effects - - - - - 1 0.98 0.25 
Firm fixed effects 1 - 0.98 - 0.94 - - 0.73 
Year fixed effect - 1 0.02 0.10 0.02 - 0.02 0.02 
MtoB i,t-1 - - - 0.20 0.01 - - - 
Profi i,t-1 - - - 0.10 0.01 - - - 
Collateral i,t-1 - - - 0.10 0.00 - - - 
Size i,t-1 - - - 0.09 0.00 - - - 
IndustryLevi,t-1 - - - 0.40 0.01 - - - 
Adj. R2 50.04% 0.79% 50.87% 18.85% 55.85% 62.22% 63.30% 63.30% 
         F-stat 1 vs 6 7.17 








Goodness of fit comparison  
Presented are the adjusted R2 and the AIC and BIC for a regression of book leverage on CEO-firm dummies. The simulated sample 
scrambles the turnover events within each firm. For a firm with n turnover events, I randomly select n years within that firm’s history 
and assign them as turnover years, thus preserving the actual sample's number of CEO-firm dummies. This process is repeated 100 
times and the table reports the average statistics of interest over the 100 replications. The sample spans the 1975-2012 period but 
excludes the firm-years for which I lack definite CEO data. Also excluded are the firms that did not experience a turnover during the 
sample period as they will be the unchanged in the simulated sample. The t-statistic for the difference are based on the standard errors 
of the statistic of interest in the simulated data. 
 
Sample with at least 30 years of data  
 
Sample with at least 20 years of data  
 




Actual Simulated Difference 
T-stat of 
difference 
Adj. R2 65.5% 62.5% 3.0% 2.10 
 
65.2% 64.0% 1.2% 2.05 
AIC -7715.083 -7366.36 -348.723 -2.16 
 
-26343.71 -25832.08 -511.6 -2.08 
BIC -5395.351 -5046.627 -348.724 -2.16 
 
-12678.14 -12166.51 -511.6 -2.08 
#Firms 122 122 
   
607 607 























Stability of the leverage cross section and CEO turnover 
Reported are the average R2s of leverage cross sections T years apart for the full sample, the turnover 
sample and the no turnover sample in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively. For each calendar year t from 1975 
to 2011, I find the cross sectional correlation between leverage in year t and leverage in years t+T 
(T=1,2,3...,20), which produces 37-T correlations for each T, which are then averaged over T.  The same 
exercise is repeated only for firms that have had a CEO turnover between years t and t+T and only for those 
that have been under the same management. Column 5 contains t-statistics, testing the hypothesis that the 
two groups (turnover and no turnover) have the same mean R2. The sample spans the 1975-2012 period but 









Difference (2) - 
(3) 
T-stat of the 
difference 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
T=1 36 73.4% 71.2% 73.6% -2.5% -1.432 
T=2 35 56.9% 54.7% 57.4% -2.7% -1.560 
T=3 34 45.3% 43.3% 46.3% -3.0% -1.943 
T=4 33 37.3% 33.7% 38.9% -5.2% -4.111 
T=5 32 31.2% 27.0% 33.8% -6.8% -5.745 
T=6 31 26.0% 23.0% 28.6% -5.6% -4.420 
T=7 30 22.4% 20.2% 25.2% -5.0% -3.676 
T=8 29 19.3% 17.8% 22.5% -4.6% -2.940 
T=9 28 16.9% 15.4% 20.9% -5.5% -3.157 
T=10 27 14.9% 13.9% 19.1% -5.2% -2.848 
T=11 26 13.3% 12.4% 16.9% -4.5% -3.101 
T=12 25 12.2% 11.3% 16.3% -5.0% -2.895 
T=13 24 11.0% 10.2% 15.2% -5.0% -2.654 
T=14 23 9.9% 9.0% 14.8% -5.8% -3.202 
T=15 22 8.9% 8.0% 14.2% -6.3% -3.606 
T=16 21 8.4% 7.6% 14.2% -6.6% -3.272 
T=17 20 7.7% 7.3% 13.4% -6.1% -2.832 
T=18 19 6.8% 6.5% 12.0% -5.5% -2.915 
T=19 18 5.6% 5.4% 11.4% -6.0% -2.922 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Migration over portfolio quartiles 
Reported are coefficients from logistic regressions in event time (T). Each calendar 
year from 1975 to 1993 I sort firms in four portfolios based on leverage ratio and 
then track the same firms for the next 20 years, resorting each year. The dependent 
variable is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm has stayed in the initial (event year 
T=0) quartile throughout the period starting in year 0 and ending in year T. Turnover 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has experienced a turnover over the past T 
years. HHI is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index proxy that measures the degree of CEO 
concentration during the previous T years. It ranges from 1, in the case of a single 
CEO, to 1/T when there has been a different executive during each of the past T 
years. More specifically, I calculate the number of years in office for each of the k 
executives within the past T years, Tenurei,k,t-T, and calculate the index according to 








The sample spans the 1975-2012 period but excludes the firm-years for which I lack 
definite CEO data. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% 
and 1% level are identified with  *, and **, respectively. 
Years elapsed 
Turnover 
coefficient T-stat HHI coefficient T-stat 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 -0.459 [-1.23] 0.919 [1.23] 
2 -0.162 [-0.78] 0.388 [0.83] 
3 0.0741 [0.49] -0.107 [-0.30] 
4 0.0532 [0.42] -0.13 [-0.43] 
5 -0.0303 [-0.27] -0.003 [-0.01] 
6 -0.0621 [-0.58] 0.104 [0.40] 
7 -0.192 [-1.84] 0.326 [1.29] 
8 -0.326** [-3.12] 0.657** [2.61] 
9 -0.430** [-4.10] 0.966** [3.89] 
10 -0.483** [-4.52] 1.159** [4.72] 
11 -0.482** [-4.40] 1.183** [4.88] 
12 -0.535** [-4.75] 1.262** [5.19] 
13 -0.548** [-4.74] 1.303** [5.37] 
14 -0.493** [-4.07] 1.379** [5.68] 
15 -0.404** [-3.19] 1.348** [5.57] 
16 -0.371** [-2.82] 1.360** [5.67] 
17 -0.300* [-2.19] 1.330** [5.58] 
18 -0.243 [-1.69] 1.272** [5.34] 
19 -0.270 [-1.83] 1.289** [5.35] 
     Year fixed 
effects  Yes 
 
Yes 







The timing of significant capital structure alterations   
The dependent variable in Panel A is the absolute value of the difference between book leverage in year t and book 
leverage in year t-1. Those models are estimated with OLS. In Panel B, I employ a logistic regression and the 
dependent variable is an indicator that takes the value of 1 if book leverage increases or decreases by more than one 
standard deviation in year t compared to year t-1, and zero otherwise.  The explanatory variables are indicator 
variables identifying the first two years of a CEO's tenure (columns 1 and 5), the second two years (columns 2 and 6), 
and the third two years (columns 3 and 7). The independent variable in the remaining four models is the number of 
years in office to date. The sample spans the 1975-2012 period but excludes the firm-years for which I lack definite 
CEO data and firms with less than 10 observations. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% 
and 1% level are identified with  *, and **, respectively. 
  Panel A. The absolute value of change in leverage:|Blevi,t-Blevi,t-1| 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         I(Yrs0&1) 0.00437** 
   
0.00273* 
  
                   
 
[3.62] 
   
[2.39] 
  
                   
         I(Yrs2&3) 
 
0.00166 
   
0.000376 
 
                   
  
[1.44] 
   
[0.36] 
 
                   
         I(Yrs4&5) 
  
0.00165 
   
0.00154                    
   
[1.35] 
   
[1.37]                    
         
Tenurei.t 
   
-0.000453** 
   
-0.000292** 
    
[-5.93] 
   
[-4.08]    
         ∆Controlsi,t 
    
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N     35,705  
    
35,705  
    
35,705      35,705      32,976      32,976  
    













  Panel B. The probability of significant changes in leverage: Pr[|Blevi.t-Blevi,t-1|>sd(Blevi)] 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         I(Yrs0&1) 0.0943* 
   
0.0763 
  
                   
 
[2.55] 
   
[1.91] 
  
                   
         I(Yrs2&3) 
 
0.0639 
   
0.0602 
 
                   
  
[1.62] 
   
[1.42] 
 
                   
         I(Yrs4&5) 
  
0.0114 
   
-0.00944                    
   
[0.26] 
   
[-0.20]                    
         
Tenurei.t 
   
-0.0134** 
   
-0.0105** 
    
[-6.42] 
   
[-4.81]    
         
∆Controlsi,t 
    
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 
       
33,578  
       
33,578  
       
33,578         33,578  
       
31,429  
       
31,429  
       



















CEO-specific leverage versus firm-specific leverage 
The dependent variable is book leverage. InitialBlev is the first nonmissing observation of book leverage for each firm in my 
sample and CEOBlev is the debt ratio measured at the end of the year during which an executive took office and stays constant 
throughout the tenure of that executive. The firm-year observations during the term of the first CEO for each firm are excluded. 
For Panel A, the model is estimated on the actual data in columns 1 and 2 and on simulated data in columns 3 and 4. To generate 
the simulated sample, I isolate the sample of firms that never change their chief executive officer in my sample and the firm-
years during the term of the first CEO of those that do, provided that they have at least 10 observations. Each firm in that 
subsample is then matched based on the length of its history to the subsample of turnover firms. Since the no turnover dataset 
includes only 450 firms, this produces a large number of matches for each firm. I randomly select one of the turnover firms and 
assign its actual CEO replacement profile to the no turnover firm, thus creating a simulated, or "false", set of turnovers. I repeat 
this exercise 100 times, measuring the CEO-specific leverage in the first year after the simulated replacement. In Panel B, the 
model is estimated on two subsamples taken from the actual data. Columns 1 and 2 include only observations for CEOs that took 
the position after their predecessor retired or passed away as indicated by the ExecuComp variable reason. Columns 3 and 4 
only include those executives that inherit the firm after it has been in the top quartile in terms of industry-adjusted profitability 
during the year right before the turnover. . All specifications account for calendar year fixed effects and the standard errors used 
to compute t-statistics (the latter reported in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. The first 
observation for each CEO is omitted to avoid identity at time 0. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 5% 
and 1% level are identified with  *, and **, respectively. 
Panel A: Actual vs simulated turnover 
  
Actual   
turnover 











(1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
       Initial Blevi,0 0.145** 0.0188 0.260** 0.106** -0.119** -0.088** 
 
[9.11] [1.44] [7.86] [4.08] [-9.24] [-4.98] 













       Controlsi,t-1 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  
Obs. 
                  
20,980  
                  
20,980  
                    
3,720  
                    
3,720  
  
Adj. R2 22.40% 43.50% 31.22% 48.73% 
  % change in adj. 











Panel B:  Natural turnover and CEO-specific leverage  
 
Natural turnover   












[4.35] [0.69]    








[14.23]    






[-4.55] [-3.36]    






[-1.43] [-1.52]    






[3.08] [1.65]    
Size i,t-1 0.0110** 0.00083 
 




[4.42] [2.01]    






[4.10] [2.98]    






[-0.55] [0.58]    
      Year fixed 




                              
3,251  
                             
3,251  
 
                              
4,733  
                              
4,733  














CEOs across firms 
The table presents the results of OLS regression of book leverage on the firm's initial leverage 
ratio (the first nonmissing book leverage observation in the sample), and a set of control 
variables (columns 3 and 4). The sample consists only of the observations under the 
management of CEOs that switch firms, excluding the initial firm that they run. I track chief 
executive officers across firms and can identify 157 CEOs that switch firms, with 10 managing 
three different firms during their ExecuComp history. ExecutiveInitialBLev is the level of 
leverage during the first year of their career in the database (i.e. during their first year in the 
initial firm that they run). All specifications account for calendar year fixed effects and the 
standard errors used to compute t-statistics (the latter reported in brackets) are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significantly different 
from zero at the 5% and 1% level are identified with  *, and **, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
     Executve Initial Blevj,0 0.195** 0.160** 0.110** 0.0847*  
 
[5.21] [4.27] [3.03] [2.33]    








[4.60]    
     MtoB i,t-1 
  
-0.0000608 0.00572 
   




   




   




   




   
[7.56] [7.28]    
_cons -0.00656 -0.039 0.365* 0.335   
 
[-0.03] [-0.20] [1.98] [1.85]    
     Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 714 714 662 662 












Figure 1.1 Stability of the leverage cross section 
The figure plots the average R2s of leverage cross sections T years apart for the full sample, the turnover sample and 
the no turnover sample. Mean R2 is on the vertical axis and the number of years between the cross sections, T, is 
plotted on the horizontal axis. For each calendar year t from 1975 to 2011, I find the cross sectional correlation 
between leverage in year t and leverage in years t+T (T=1,2,3...,20), which produces 37-T correlations for each T, 
which are then averaged over T.  The same exercise is repeated only for firms that have had a CEO turnover 



































Appendix 1. Variable Definitions 
 
Book leverage (Blev) the ratio of total debt (item 34, debt in current liabilities + item 9, long-term debt) to item 




the ratio of market value of assets (MVA) to item6, total assets. MVA is obtained as 
item6, total assets - book value of equity (item6, total assets - item9, long-term debt  - 
item 130, preferred stock + item 35, deferred taxes and investment tax credit) + the 
market value of equity (item 199, price-close*item 54, shares outstanding). 
  
Profitability (Profi) ratio of Compustat item 13, operating income before depreciation, to the lagged level of 
item 6, total assets 
  
Collateral item 8,net property, plant and equipment, scaled by item 6,total assets 
  













THE MYTH OF TIGHTENING CREDIT RATING 
STANDARDS IN THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE DEBT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) play an important role in the efficient operation of capital 
markets. They collect and analyze information to assess the default risk of issuers, thus alleviating 
information asymmetry between market participants. CRAs also affect markets through a 
regulatory channel as certain institutional investors and financial intermediaries are only allowed 
to hold investment-grade bonds or face capital requirements based on credit ratings. CRAs have 
been subject to widespread criticism in the wake of the 2008 financial collapse and accused of 
being too lax in their credit risk assessment of mortgage-backed securities. A systematic upward 
bias in ratings is a byproduct of the issuer-pays business model employed by CRAs and is only 
mitigated by reputational concerns.1  
While there is little doubt that CRAs contributed to the recent financial crisis by assigning 
inflated ratings to structured financial instruments (White, 2010; Partnoy, 2009; Archarya and 
Richardson, 2009; Griffin and Tang, 2012), the literature examining credit rating standards in 
corporate debt seems to indicate that rating inflation is a thing of the past.  
As the average credit rating of U.S. public corporations has declined over the last 30 years, 
researchers have investigated the reasons behind that trend. Existing literature attributes this 
                                                          
1 The issuer-pays model creates conflicts of interest and incentivizes CRAs to cater to issuers by assigning 





decline to a systematic tightening of credit rating standards as opposed to any significant increase 
in the default risk of rated firms. A rise in rating conservatism implies that the value of reputation 
to CRAs has increased over time, perhaps due to increased scrutiny and regulatory changes in 
recent years. Thus, to the degree that rating inflation exists in the corporate debt market today, it’s 
level should be considerably lower than in the past.  
In this study, I reexamine the time-series variation in credit rating standards and find 
empirical evidence that casts doubt on the notion that CRAs have become more conservative over 
time. First, I show that the time-series pattern in the estimated proxy for rating standards is mostly 
driven by the market-based variables employed in the credit rating model. While this finding does 
not contradict the increased rating conservatism explanation, it is also consistent with an 
alternative scenario where firms have been subject to greater levels of mispricing in the equity 
market and, thus, the market-based risk measures have become less correlated to fundamentals 
over time. If CRAs possess soft information that allows them to see through the mispricing and 
assign ratings based on the fundamental changes in credit risk, then the decline in the average 
rating over time could be due to an increase in default risk as opposed to a tightening of credit 
rating standards. Employing an empirical strategy designed to distinguish between the two 
explanations, I find support for the latter in the data.  
Following the literature, I estimate rating conservatism in recent years as the difference 
between the firm’s actual rating and the rating predicted by a credit risk model estimated only in 
the beginning of the sample period that captures the initial standards. If the predicted rating is 
higher than the actual (the difference is negative), then the firm has suffered from conservatism. 
Alternatively, the predicted rating could be higher because the firm has been subject to 





positive correlation between the measure of conservatism and future stock returns would lend 
support to the latter explanation. I first confirm this implication in a panel regression of the 
difference between actual and predicted rating on future returns, controlling for firm 
characteristics. I also perform portfolio analysis and find that the decile portfolio containing firms 
with the lowest rating difference earns significantly lower raw and risk-adjusted returns than the 
decile with the highest difference, suggesting that the firms which appear to be affected by 
conservatism the most are also overvalued in the equity market. 
Another testable implication of the mispricing scenario is that CRAs will rely more on soft 
information in the presence of mispricing which will manifest as a decline in the explanatory power 
of the credit rating model. I estimate cross-sectional regressions of the model for each year in the 
sample and, as hypothesized, find that the adjusted R-squared is lower when the standards proxy 
is signifying greater conservatism. While the two alternative explanations are not mutually 
exclusive, the finding that the measure of credit standards is also capturing the effect of equity 
market mispricing implies that the level of rating conservatism reported in prior studies is, at best, 
overstated. This is the first main contribution of the paper.  
Crucial to the validity of the tightening standards claim is the assumption that the credit 
rating model utilized in the measurement of standards correctly captures the observables that CRAs 
consider in assigning ratings. As prior studies acknowledge, an omitted variable exhibiting a time 
trend could invalidate their findings and, while that issue can never be fully addressed, the authors 
consider several alternative specifications to establish the robustness of their main finding. None 
of the robustness checks, however, allows for the risk characteristics of unrated firms in the sample 
to affect the credit risk of rated firms. In the second main contribution of this study, I propose an 





CRAs analyze in the rating process. Furthermore, when estimating the proxy for conservatism with 
the proposed model, I find no evidence that rating standards have changed over time.  
Two of the most important variables in the credit rating model are the firm’s market value 
of equity and idiosyncratic return volatility. Theoretically and empirically, the probability of 
default is decreasing with firm size and increasing with return volatility.2 The average rated firm 
has increased in size and has lower idiosyncratic risk in recent years, which implies a decline in 
credit risk. Thus, we should observe an improvement in the average credit rating over time, which 
is what the predicted rating is capturing.  This study shows that market cap and idiosyncratic risk 
are also the variables most responsible for the time-series variation in the proxy for rating standards 
and that, at least partially, this is due to mispricing of the firm’s equity that these variables are 
capturing. To remove the effect of any overall sentiment in the equity market from the annual 
average of the two risk characteristics, I divide each variable by its cross-sectional mean calculated 
over all firms in the sample (rated and unrated) before including it in the credit risk model. 
Furthermore, by including the unrated firms in the calculation of the annual average, this model 
allows for the possibility that CRAs consider the firm’s size and idiosyncratic equity risk relative 
to those of other firms in the economy.3 I compare various goodness-of-fit measures and show that 
the model with scaled market-based variables has higher explanatory power in panel regressions 
                                                          
2 Large firms tend to be more diversified with less volatile cash flows and more established product lines 
and thus will have a lower probability of default, ceteris paribus. Firms with higher equity risk are expected 
to be less able to service their debt as they will have higher volatility of the underlying cash flows from 
operations. Furthermore, idiosyncratic risk could provide information about the quality of management, 
which will also imply a negative correlation between that variable and credit ratings. 
3 Note that if we scale the variables by their cross-sectional mean calculated only over the rated sample, we 
force the annual average of the scaled characteristics to be constant over time, which doesn’t allow them to 
explain the decline in ratings. By including unrated firms in the denominator, the annual average of the 
scaled variables for rated firms can vary over time depending on the relative rate of change in the 
characteristics across rated and unrated firms. A detailed discussion of the scaling procedure employed in 





of credit ratings. I further find that the scaled model outperforms the one utilized in prior studies 
in both in- and out-of-sample predictive accuracy and thus conclude that it is more representative 
of the model CRAs employ. 
I then examine the time-series variation in the proxy for rating conservatism estimated with 
the scaled model. In contrast to prior literature, I find that CRAs have applied consistent standards 
in assigning ratings over time. Plotting the cross-sectional means of the scaled market 
capitalization and idiosyncratic risk of rated firms, I find that the average rated firm has become 
smaller and has higher equity risk, relative to other firms in the economy. Per the scaled risk 
characteristics, the decline in the average credit rating that we observe over the last three decades 
is a result of an increase in the probability of default of the average rated firm. 
This result is important because changes in rating criteria that do not reflect variation in 
the credit risk of the underlying security undermine the usefulness of credit ratings to market 
participants. Furthermore, S&P “Principles of Credit Ratings” report (Dec. 22, 2015) states: 
“Standard & Poor's intends for each rating symbol to connote the same general level of 
creditworthiness for issuers and issues in different sectors and at different times.” While prior 
studies question the “at different times” part of the above statement by showing time-series 
variation in rating standards, the empirical analysis in this article indicates that this part of S&P’s 
claim rings true.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 summarizes the prior 
literature on credit ratings as it relates to this study. Section 2.3 describes the data and summary 







2.2 Prior literature and contribution 
The strand of the literature on credit ratings most related to this study examines the time-
series variation in rating standards. Starting with Blume, Lim, and Mackinlay (1998) and later Alp 
(2013) and Baghai, Servaes, and Tamayo (2014) - henceforth BLM, Alp, and BST - have shown 
that rating standards for corporate bonds have tightened over time.4 BLM examine investment 
grade firms over the 1978 – 1995 period. Alp includes both investment and speculative grade firms 
in the analysis of credit standards between 1985 and 2007 and argues that standards on average 
have remained relatively stable until 2002 when a structural shift occurs towards more stringent 
ratings. The author attributes the structural shift to the accounting scandals of Enron and 
WorldCom that took place at that time as well as the subsequent passage of SOX which resulted 
in increased scrutiny of rating agencies by both investors and regulators. The effect is also 
economically significant – if a firm didn’t change its risk characteristics over the sample period its 
credit rating in 2007 will be about 1.5 notches lower than the one in 1985. BST extend the analysis 
to 2009 and, using a slightly different set of control variables, find an even sharper tightening of 
standards amounting to 3 notches over the sample period. They also report that firms affected more 
by conservatism issue less debt, have lower leverage, hold more cash, are less likely to obtain a 
debt rating, and experience lower growth.  
This article contributes to the literature by showing that the apparent tightening of standards 
found by prior studies is a result of employing an imprecise measure of rating standards that also 
captures mispricing in the equity market and is sensitive to model specification. In contrast to the 
existing literature, I conclude that the decline in the average credit rating over time is caused by 
                                                          
4 Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Hund (2017) add to this literature by investigating changes in rating standards 






an increase in the default risk of the average firm and credit rating standards have remained 
consistent over the sample period. Jorion et.al. (2009) argue that the decline in ratings between 
1985 and 2002 could be explained by declining accounting quality and not tightening standards. 
Gu and Zhao (2007) cast doubt on that conclusion as do Alp and BST, who show that controlling 
for discretionary accruals does not affect the negative trend in rating standards in their sample. 
While the present study does not directly measure the quality of credit ratings, my findings 
imply that, inflated or not, ratings on average have remained consistently so over time. 5 The 
literature reports mixed evidence on ratings quality. Chen, Gu, and Yao (2017) advance a 
theoretical model where ratings are procyclical with inflation being more likely in expansion 
periods and deflation more likely during recessions. That result differs from the implications in 
Bar-Isaac and Shapiro (2013) and Fulghieri, Strobl, and Xia (2014) who demonstrate that rating 
quality is countercyclical. The model in Opp, Opp, and Harris (2013) implies that rating inflation 
is a feature of the structured products market and not present in corporate debt. Mathis, 
McAndrews, and Rochet (2009) also find incentives for CRAs to assign inflated ratings to be 
stronger for complex securities. Empirically, Jiang, Stanford, and Xie (2012) find evidence of 
inflation by showing that S&P assigned higher ratings after employing the issuer-pays business 
model in 1974. Baghai and Becker (2016) employ a unique dataset on payments for non-rating 
services in India and report that issuers who pay agencies for those services receive inflated ratings. 
Covitz and Harrison (2003), on the other hand, examine rating changes between 1997 and 2002 
and argue that CRAs do not cater to issuers because of reputational concerns. Cheng and Neamtiu 
(2009) show that increased reputational concerns have disciplined CRAs and improved rating 
quality over time.  
                                                          






Becker and Milbourn (2011) investigate the effect of competition among CRAs on rating 
quality. Theoretically, competition could either exacerbate rating inflation, as issuers engage in 
ratings shopping, or mitigate it, as reputation capital becomes more valuable. The authors find 
evidence in support of the former when examining the effect of Fitch’s entering the rating market 
alongside S&P and Moody’s. Bae et. al. (2015), however, challenge this result by showing that the 
effect of Fitch’s market share on ratings inflation is insignificant when controlling for industry 
fixed effects. Other studies also disagree on the net effect of competition on the quality of ratings 
in the corporate debt market. An upward bias in ratings is theoretically predicted by Bolton, 
Freixas, and Shapiro (2012) and empirically supported by Bae, Driss, and Roberts (2016) and 
Bongaerts, Cremers, and Goetzmann (2012), while Xia (2014) find the reputation effect to be 
dominating.  
Independent of the information that ratings convey about the credit risk of issuers, they still 
affect capital markets through the regulation channel and thus can influence the allocation of risk 
capital in the economy. Consistent with the importance of credit ratings, a growing number of 
studies show their effect on different corporate policies such as capital structure choice (Graham 
and Harvey, 2001; Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2009; Kisgen and Strahan, 2010), and investment 
decisions (Chernenko and Sunderam, 2012; Begley, 2013).  
 
2.3 Data and summary statistics 
The sample consists of the universe of firms in Standard and Poor's Compustat database 
which provides annual firm-level financial data. Stock return data are gathered from CRSP. I 
require nonmissing values for all explanatory variables and exclude all financial firms (primary 





dollars. S&P long-term issuer credit rating is converted into numerical scale with AAA =17 and 
CCC=1. As in Alp, I pool together CCC-, CCC, and CCC+ rated firms into the lowest rating 
category and drop the firms with ratings indicating default. To mitigate the effect of outliers and 
incorrectly recorded data I trim all variables at the one percent. The final dataset consists of 23,218 
observations for rated and 61,329 observations for unrated firms and covers the period from 1985 
to 2014. The set of control variables used in the credit rating model is informed by prior literature 
for consistency. To proxy for the firm’s default risk, I use the following firm characteristics: 
interest coverage (Int.Cov.), operating margin (Op.Margin), book leverage (BLev), size (measured 
as the natural log of market value of equity adjusted for inflation, MCap), market-to-book ratio 
(M/B), tangibility (Tangibility), R&D expense (R&D), cash balances (Cash), retained earnings 
(RE), capital expenditures (Capex), dividend payer dummy (Dividend), systematic risk (Beta), and 
idiosyncratic risk (Idios. Risk).6  
Table 2.1 presents summary statistics for all explanatory variables for firms-years with and 
without credit rating in the sample.  Rated firms are larger, more profitable, use more debt, are 
more likely to pay dividends, and have higher retained earnings and tangibility. They also keep 
their cash balances lower, invest less in R&D and have lower idiosyncratic risk and higher 
systematic risk. 
Table 2.2 reports the credit rating distribution in the sample by year and rating category. 
The percentage of rated firms with speculative grade is increasing steadily from 31% in 1991 to 
51% in 2002 and stabilizing at around 53% afterwards. The last column of this table contains the 
percentage of firms with credit rating in the sample over time – while rated firms comprise about 
one fifth of the sample in earlier years, that number doubles by the end of the period.   
                                                          





In Figures 2.1 and 2.2, I plot the average (median) credit rating and the ratio of downgrades 
to upgrades over time, respectively. As reported in Table 2.2, there is a negative trend in the 
average credit rating of U.S. public firms over the 1991-2002 period where the average(median) 
rating decreased from 9.4(10) to 7.3(7), followed by relatively stable ratings in the post-2002 
period. Downgrades are more frequent than upgrades throughout the sample period with a sharp 
increase in 2002 and 2009. In the following sections, I investigate the possible explanations for 
the pattern in the time-series of the average credit rating. 
 
2.4 Empirical results 
2.4.1 Measures of credit rating standards 
I begin the empirical analysis by replicating the main findings regarding credit rating 
standards of the three prior studies. One way to measure the variation in rating standards over time 
is by estimating a panel regression of credit ratings on firm-level accounting and market-based 
proxies for default risk as well as yearly dummies for all years after the initial one. Under the 
assumption that the model correctly captures the risk characteristics of the firm and that the slope 
coefficients remain constant over time, the time-variation in the annual intercept should capture 
the change in standards relative to the first year in the panel. A negative(positive) sign on the year 
indicator t means that if a firm kept its risk characteristics constant between 1985 and year t, it will 
receive a lower(higher) rating in year t than in 1985. Prior studies document a negative trend in 
the annual intercept and interpret this result as evidence of tightening credit rating standards.  
I estimate the credit rating model in the full sample and present the results in Table 2.3. 





industry fixed effects and column 3 has firm fixed effects.7 All coefficients have the expected signs 
(except for MB which becomes negative in the firm fixed effects model). The main variables of 
interest are the yearly dummies and I plot the coefficients resulting from the three estimation 
procedures in Figure 2.3. As in Alp, when estimating an ordered probit regression I find that rating 
standards remain relatively constant from 1986 to 2002 and exhibit a steady decline between 2002 
and 2007. A firm with the same risk characteristics will have a credit rating that is about 1.5 notches 
lower in 2007 than in 1985. The decline in standards based on the two OLS models is even more 
pronounced and the rating of a firm with the same risk characteristics will drop by around 2.5 
notches by 2007. However, we can also see that standards loosen sharply in 2008 and then become 
more stringent again afterwards. This is a somewhat puzzling result given that the average rating 
has remained relatively stable throughout that period and it is hard to imagine an economic 
explanation for such sharp changes in rating standards in the span of only two years. Instead, the 
variation between 2007 and 2009 is most likely the result of the financial crisis as CRAs claim to 
rate through the cycle and the proxy for rating standards would not account for that fact. 
An alternative way to measure the trend in credit standards that both Alp and BST employ 
is to estimate the rating model in the early years of the sample period, omitting the yearly indicator 
variables, and use the estimated coefficients to predict the ratings of each firm in later years. The 
prediction represents the rating a firm should receive if CRAs applied the same standards that they 
used at the beginning of the sample period, holding risk characteristics constant. Thus, the 
difference between the actual and the predicted rating is a measure of the degree to which each 
                                                          
7 Alp and BLM estimate the model with ordered probit. BST initially estimate ordered probit, OLS and firm 
fixed effects and, finding similar results, proceed with the latter two techniques for the following analysis 





firm is affected by any change in rating standards and the variation in the annual average of this 
difference serves as an alternative proxy for credit rating conservatism.  
I employ this approach using the OLS with industry fixed effects model and two different 
sample periods in the estimation of the early rating standards: 1985 to 1990 and 1985 to 1996.8 
Thus, for each year t, starting in either 1991 or 1997, and for each firm i, I compute: 
 
(1)          𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
1990 =  ?̂?1990 +  ?̂?1990 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡                                                                      
(2)          𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
1996 =  ?̂?1996 +  ?̂?1996 ∗ 𝑋𝑖,𝑡                                                                      
 
Then I define: 
 
(3)          𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
1990 =  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
1990                                                         
(4)          𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡
1996 =  𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 −  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
1996                                                                        
 
When the difference takes on negative values, a firm has been affected by rating conservatism. 
Figure 2.4 plots the annual average of the two measures of credit rating standards, 
RatingDifference1990 and RatingDifference1960.  In both cases, the pattern in rating standards is very 
similar to the one observed with the yearly dummies approach and indicates a tightening of 
standards, especially in the post-2002 period. I then decompose the RatingDifference variables and 
plot the average predicted rating and the average actual rating separately in Figure 2.5. In the years 
prior to 2002, both the prediction and the actual rating are declining steadily. However, after 2002 
                                                          
8 The main findings are qualitatively unchanged if I use the ordered probit with industry fixed effect or the 





the average rating remains relatively stable, while the prediction exhibits a sharp increase between 
2002 and 2007, followed by a dip in 2008 and again a sharp rise afterwards. Thus, the observed 
structural break in rating standards after 2002 is the result of a structural break in the prediction as 
opposed to one in the pattern of the actual rating.  
To better understand the economic factors behind the apparent tightening of rating 
standards, I pose the question of whether the time-series variation in any of the explanatory 
variables used in the model is singularly responsible for the pattern in the predicted ratings. To this 
end, I first remove the effect of each control variable from the prediction and then plot the average 
predicted rating with and without that variable to gauge its effect on the prediction. Thus, for each 
explanatory variable M in the vector of variables X, I compute: 
 
(5)          𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡
1990 =  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
1990 −  ?̂?𝑀
1990 ∗ 𝑀𝑖,𝑡                         
(6)          𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑀𝑖,𝑡
1996 =  𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡
1996 −  ?̂?𝑀
1996 ∗ 𝑀𝑖,𝑡                                        
 
Figures 2.6-2.18 present the annual average of the prediction excluding each of 13 
explanatory variables in turn and using the 1985-1996 period.9 While excluding different firm 
characteristics changes the level of the prediction up or down depending on the sign of the 
estimated coefficient, only two of the control variables significantly affect the time-series pattern 
in the average predicted rating – Market Cap and Idiosyncratic Risk. In Figure 2.19, I plot the 
predicted rating after subtracting the effect of both of those variables and we no longer see any 
significant structural break. Instead the average predicted rating is much more stable throughout 
the sample period.  
                                                          





Figure 2.20 plots the average Market Cap and Idiosyncratic Risk of rated firms over time. 
The average rated firm experiences an increase in market value of equity and a decrease in 
idiosyncratic return volatility, especially in the post-2002 period. As those variables are among the 
most important factors in the credit rating model, their observed time-series variation would imply 
a decline in the average default probability of rated firms and, therefore, an increase in the average 
credit rating.10 If credit rating agencies tightened standards in recent years, the findings above have 
implications for the specific way in which they did so. In particular, they imply that CRAs 
tightened standards in the later period by employing a rating model that penalizes higher 
idiosyncratic return volatility more severely and views higher market capitalization less favorably 
than in the earlier period. However, there is an alternative explanation that is also consistent with 
the results presented so far. It is possible that the increase in market capitalization and the decline 
in volatility in the post-2002 period are not justified by fundamentals and are, instead, driven by 
overvaluation in the equity market. As credit rating agencies possess soft information, they could 
be able to discern the effect of fundamentals on default risk from the mispricing and this could 
potentially account for the decline in the average credit rating that we observe over time. It is worth 
noting that the two scenarios are not mutually exclusive and the difference between the actual and 
the predicted rating could be proxying for both conservatism and mispricing as it will be decreasing 
in both. In the following section, I show that mispricing plays a role and, thus, the level of 
conservatism in credit rating standards is, at best, overstated in prior literature. 
2.4.2 The RatingDifference - credit rating standards or mispricing? 
BST employ the RatingDifference1996 as a firm-level measure of the degree to which each 
firm is affected by changes in rating standards and use it to analyze its response to rating 
                                                          
10 MCap has the highest t-statistic in all three models estimated in Table 3, while Idios.Risk’s t-statistic 





conservatism. In this section, I show that the two proxies, RatingDifference1990 and  
RatingDifference1996, are also capturing the effect of mispricing in the equity market, especially 
after 2002.  
First, I show that the two difference measures are positively correlated to future returns. I 
estimate a regression of the RatingDifference1996 and RatingDifference1990 on future returns, 
controlling for contemporaneous and lagged returns, as well as the lagged credit rating and lagged 
firm characteristics.11 The results are reported in columns 1 and 4 of Panel A, Table 2.4, where the 
sample period is 1997-2014 and 1991-2014, respectively. For both measures, there is a positive 
correlation between the current rating difference and future returns. Furthermore, when I split the 
sample into two periods, before and after 2002, I find that the RatingDifference is only positively 
correlated with future returns in the later period (columns 2, 3, 5, and 6). 
Prior studies have shown that firms with high credit ratings realize higher returns than firms 
with low ratings.12 As the RatingDifference is increasing in the firm’s credit rating, holding the 
predicted rating constant, it is possible that the correlation with future returns is driven by the 
rating as opposed to the difference. This concern is alleviated by the fact that the regressions of 
RatingDifference control for the effect of lagged credit rating and changes in rating are relatively 
infrequent events in the sample. Furthermore, while the correlation between the RatingDifference 
variables and the credit rating is positive, it is only 0.068 (0.072) for RatingDifference1996 
(RatingDifference1990). Also, if the correlation with future returns is driven solely by the rating, it 
should be robust to using different periods but it is not significant in the pre-2002 period. 
                                                          
11 In the context of this regression, future realized returns serve as an ex-post proxy for mispricing. Including 
future returns as an independent variable is also employed in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003) who examine 
the effect of nonfundamental price movements on corporate investment. The authors find that the variable 
contains independent information about future expected returns, and, thus, about mispricing. 






Nevertheless, as an additional test, I replicate the analysis of Panel A, Table 2.4, using only 
the PredictedRating as a dependent variable which allows me to control for both contemporaneous 
and lagged credit rating. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 2.4 and confirm the 
interpretation of the RatingDifference as a measure of mispricing. Holding credit rating and the 
change in credit rating constant, firms that have higher predicted ratings, and therefore a lower 
difference, have lower returns over the following year.  
An alternative way of showing the correlation between RatingDifference and mispricing is 
through portfolio analysis which I undertake next. At the end of December of each year t, I sort 
firms into deciles based on the value of their RatingDifference measured at the fiscal year ending 
in calendar year t. Decile 10 contains the firms with the lowest RatingDifference while decile 1 is 
comprised of the firms with the highest RatingDifference. Therefore, an investment strategy that 
goes long portfolio 1 and shorts the firms in portfolio 10 is expected to generate abnormal returns.13 
I then track the monthly and cumulative equally weighed buy-and-hold portfolio returns over the 
following 12 months.14  
Table 2.5 summarizes the average of the 1-month, 6-month cumulative and 12-month 
cumulative raw returns as well as the average and median credit rating for each of the ten 
portfolios. When the portfolios are formed based on RatingDifference1996 (RatingDifference1990), 
the sample period is 1998-2014 (1992-2014). The last two rows of the table contain the difference 
between returns of decile 1 and decile 10 and its p-value. During the first month after portfolio 
formation, firms with the highest RatingDifference1996 (RatingDifference1990) earn a statistically 
                                                          
13 If a variable can identify mispriced firms, then a strategy that goes long the undervalued firms and shorts 
the overvalued ones will generate a positive alpha as the mispricing is eventually corrected.  
14 I also report the results that follow with monthly rebalancing to keep the weights equal over the 12 months 
following portfolio formation in the appendix. This strategy will, however, generate considerable trading 





and economically significant 2.3%(1.9%) higher return on average than firms with the lowest 
difference. The return differential persists over the next year with the 6-month and 12-month 
average cumulative returns being 10.3% (8.9%) and 17%(14.2%) higher, respectively.  
Table 2.6 reports alphas and betas from the CAPM and Fama-French (1993) three-factor 
models. I run time-series regressions of the monthly returns from a trading strategy buying stocks 
in the decile with the highest RatingDifference (decile 1) and shorting stocks in the lowest 
RatingDifference (decile 10) on the factors. The reported alphas are in percentages per month. This 
trading strategy generates positive and significant alphas for both RatingDifference1996 and 
RatingDifference1990. However, when the sample is split into the pre- and post-2002 periods, we 
find that the abnormal returns are only present in the latter period.  
As mentioned above, the abnormal returns could be a result of the positive rating-return 
relation reported by prior literature. However, this is unlikely since the average (median) rating in 
the lowest and highest deciles are similar as reported in Table 2.4. In fact, the average(median) 
rating in decile 1 is 7.1(5.7) while it is 6.1(6.1) in decile 10 when sorting on RatingDifference1996 
and those values are 7.3(6.3) and 6.6(6.6) when sorting on RatingDifference1990. Nevertheless, I 
address this issue further by replicating the analysis performed in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 after first 
excluding the 2 lowest rating categories from the sample (CCC and B-).  Avramov et. al. (2009) 
investigate the puzzling correlation between credit ratings and stock returns and find that the credit 
risk effect is mainly driven by the lowest-graded firms. They sequentially eliminate the firms with 
the lowest credit rating from the sample and then sort the remaining firms into rating deciles, 
reporting the return differential between the highest and lowest deciles after each elimination. The 
authors find that excluding all stocks with a rating of CCC and below results in insignificant return 





results remain unchanged (reported in the appendix). In addition to that, I follow the procedure 
described in Bali and Hovakimian (2009) and perform dependent double sorts to control for the 
effect of credit ratings on abnormal returns. Namely, firms are first sorted into ten portfolios based 
on their credit rating each year and then, within each rating portfolio, firms are sorted into deciles 
based on the RatingDifference.15 Next, the difference deciles 1 from each rating decile are averaged 
into a single difference decile 1, difference deciles 2 are averaged into a single decile 2, etc. I then 
proceed by replicating the analysis in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 using the new RatingDifference deciles 
that now contain firms from all rating portfolios and thus control for the effect of credit rating. 
Table 2.7 contains the average 1-month, 6-month and 12-month raw returns for each decile and 
Table 2.8 reports the coefficients from the estimation of the two market models. The implications 
of the portfolio analysis performed with single sorting are unaffected when we control for credit 
ratings. Thus, the results reported in this section conclusively show that the measure used by prior 
studies to capture variation in credit rating standards is also proxying for mispricing in the equity 
market.   
In summary, the empirical analysis performed in this study so far draws the following 
conclusions: 1) RattingDifference variable is indicating tightening of standards mostly after 2002; 
2) RattingDifference is driven mainly by the pattern in the prediction as actual ratings are relatively 
stable after 2002; 3) The pattern in the prediction is driven mostly by the market-based variables 
in the model which gives rise to an alternative interpretation based on mispricing that rating 
agencies can see through; 4) RattingDifference is also capturing the effect of mispricing since it is 
positively correlated with future returns and portfolio analysis results in abnormal returns. The 
main implication is that the tightening of rating standards after 2002 is not as pronounced as prior 
                                                          
15 Note that prior to sorting into rating porfolios, a random number is drawn from N(0,0.01) distribution 





studies argue and, in fact, it could be the case that standards have remained unchanged throughout 
the sample period. The following section argues that an alternative specification of the credit risk 
model approximates the model used by CRAs more closely and finds little change in rating 
standards over time when that specification is employed. 
2.4.3 An alternative specification of the credit rating model 
All prior studies acknowledge that the finding of tightening credit rating standards is only 
valid in terms of the specific variables included in the credit rating model. As shown in the previous 
section, the measure of rating standards is also related to mispricing in more recent years. This 
implies that the increase in MCap and decrease in Idos.Risk post-2002 are, at least in part, due to 
overvaluation. If CRAs can extract the information related to fundamentals from those two 
variables, then we will expect to see a greater reliance on soft information in later years. 
Econometrically, this translates to diminished explanatory power of the model during the years 
when overvaluation is most severe as MCap and Idios.Risk. become poor measures of default risk 
at those times. To test this hypothesis, I estimate cross sectional regressions of the credit rating 
model for each year in the sample. The average adjusted R-squared for the pre-2002 period is 
77.2% and falls to 75.4% in the post-2002 period with the sharpest decline being between 2002 
and 2007, when the explanatory power of the model decreases from 77.7% to 72.5%. Furthermore, 
in time-series regressions, I find that the RatingDifference variables are significantly positively 
correlated with the cross sectional adjusted R-squared of the model.16 
In this section, I propose an alternative way of measuring the effect of MCap and Idios.Risk 
on credit ratings. Namely, each year I compute the mean of the two variables including both the 
rated and unrated firms in the sample and then scale the firm’s MCap and Idios.Risk by dividing 
                                                          





them by their cross-sectional means. Scaling in this way has two effects. First, as the cross-
sectional means will be correlated to the overall sentiment in the equity market, scaling will remove 
the average mispricing from each observation each year. Second, it allows for changes in the 
average risk characteristics of unrated firms over time to affect the credit risk of rated firms. In 
other words, it implies that it is not the level of market value of equity and idiosyncratic volatility 
that determine credit risk but rather the firm’s MCap and Idios.Risk relative to those of other firms 
in the economy. I argue that this alternative specification more closely captures the model that 
CRAs use in assigning ratings. 
With the procedure outlined in section 2.4.1, I can also calculate the PredictedRating 
variables for the unrated firms in the sample. Under the assumption that the marginal effect of each 
firm characteristic on default risk is the same in the sample of rated and unrated firms, the annual 
average of this prediction serves as an estimate of the average probability of default of unrated 
firms. Figure 2.21 plots the average PredictedRating1990 and PredictedRating1996 of unrated firms 
over time as well as those of rated firms for comparison. Interestingly, the patterns in the two 
predictions are very similar and even more pronounced for unrated firms. In unreported results, I 
find that the time-series variation in the average prediction of unrated firms is also driven mostly 
by the MCap and Idios.Risk variables. Furthermore, if we compare the evolution of those two 
characteristics across rated and unrated firms (Figure 2.22 and Figure 2.23), we see that while the 
average rated firm has increased in size and decreased in unsystematic risk in the post-2002 period, 
those changes are even more pronounced for unrated firms.  
In Figure 2.24, I plot the time series of the scaled MCap and scaled Idios.Risk for rated 
firms. The plots reveal that, relative to other firms in the economy, rated firms have become smaller 





credit risk of rated firms has increased over time which means that the decline in the average credit 
rating that we observe in the data is justified.  
Indeed, when I estimate the three rating models as in Table 2.3, replacing MCap and 
Idios.Risk with their scaled alternatives, there are no longer any discernible trends in rating 
standards over time as illustrated by Figure 2.25. This figure plots the coefficients on the yearly 
dummies from the three scaled models as well as the ones obtained with the original models for 
comparison. I also compute the two RatingDifference variables with the scaled model and plot 
their annual averages in Figure 2.26 next to the ones resulting from the base model. While we still 
observe a slight decrease in the difference from 2002 to 2007, its magnitude is substantially lower 
and arguably economically insignificant.17 
Next, I examine various goodness-of-fit measures to compare the explanatory power of the 
scaled model to that of the base model. Note that the level and scaled independent variables are 
perfectly positively correlated in the cross section so we can only contrast the goodness-of-fit of 
the two alternatives in a panel. I first split the sample into pre- and post-2002 subsamples and then 
estimate the credit rating models with both scaled and unscaled MCap and Idios.Risk in each 
period. Table 2.9 reports the McFadden’s pseudo-R squared, AIC and BIC information criteria 
statistics, as well as measures of in-sample and out-of-sample predictive accuracy for the rating 
models estimated with the ordered probit procedure.18  
In terms of pseudo-R squared, the two models perform equally well in the pre-2002 period, 
while the scaled model’s explanatory power is 1.5% higher in the later period. AIC and BIC 
                                                          
17 Between 2002 and 2007, the change in RatingDifference1996 (RatingDifference1990) implied by the scaled 
model is -0.57(-0.67) compared to -1.75 (-1.85) when those variables are estimated using the unscaled 
model. 






indicate strong preference for the scaled model, especially in the later period. The last two rows of 
the table compare the predictive accuracy of the two models which is defined here as the 
percentage of firm-years that have predicted credit rating within 1 notch of the actual rating. I first 
estimate this statistic in-sample and find that both models predict ratings within 1 notch of actual 
ratings for roughly 45% of the observations in the early period. However, in the post-2002 panel, 
the scaled model’s in-sample predictive accuracy is 2.3% higher than that of the unscaled model.   
To estimate the out-of-sample predictive accuracy, I first estimate each model in each 
period and then compute the predicted values for the period not used in the estimation. Reported 
again are the percentage of observations with a prediction that is within 1 notch of the actual rating. 
This procedure is similar to the computation of the RatingDifference variables, and, as expected, I 
find that when we use the estimated slopes from the pre-2002 period to compute the predicted 
rating in the post-2002 sample, the scaled model is substantially more accurate with 50% of the 
observations being within 1 notch while this number is only 28.9% with the unscaled model. More 
importantly, though, I find that the accuracy of the scaled model is still better when the later period 
slopes are used to predict ratings in the earlier period. In summary, all goodness of fit measures 
show that the scaled model better explains the variation in credit ratings and, thus, is a better 
approximation of the model that CRAs use. 
2.4.4 The RatingDifference and credit spreads 
Both Alp and BST relate the measure of rating standards to credit spreads and find that 
firms affected by conservatism more severely have lower spreads, ceteris paribus. The 
interpretation is that the bond markets can see through the increased strictness of rating standards 
and narrow spreads for firms with credit rating that is lower than the one they should have gotten 





AAA, AA, A, and BBB Moody’s 10-year corporate bond yield indices over the 10-year Treasury 
yield on the annual measure of rating standards and controls. As conservatism increases, the 
average probability of default within each rating category, and therefore the credit spread for that 
category, is expected to decrease.  The author finds support for this statement in the data.  
As this study shows that the RatingDifference is also a proxy for mispricing, an alternative 
interpretation for the correlation between that variable and credit spreads emerges.  Namely, if 
mispricing in the equity market translates to mispricing in the debt market, then firms with 
overvalued equity (the low RatingDifference firms) will be more likely to also have overpriced 
public debt and, therefore, lower credit spreads, ceteris paribus.  
In Table 2.10, I replicate the analysis in Alp and regress the AAA and BBB Moody’s 10-
year corporate bond spreads on the two RatingDifference variables, controlling for the 10-year 
Treasury yield, the difference between the 10-year and 2-year Treasury rates and the difference 
between the 30-day euro rate and the 3-month Treasury rate. I also find that credit spreads increase 
in the RatingDifference (columns 1-4). However, if we add the average idiosyncratic volatility to 
the model, it renders the RatingDifference variables insignificant in all cases (columns 5-8). As 
the mean idiosyncratic volatility captures the effect of mispricing in the equity market on credit 
spreads, this finding implies that rating standards, net of mispricing, are not correlated to debt 
spreads.  
2.4.5 Discussion on scaling 
Prior studies perform multiple robustness tests to confirm the validity of their main finding 
of tightening credit standards, including controlling for the effect of macroeconomic indicators, 
adding alternative explanatory variables, and adding the square and cube terms of the controls, 





characteristics of the unrated firms in the sample, which could affect the risk environment for rated 
firms. 
All three studies also perform at least some form of scaling of the market-based explanatory 
variables in the model. Alp uses NYSE percentile instead of the market capitalization as a measure 
of size, which is also expressing the size of rated firms in relative terms. However, this variable 
still fails to capture the effect of changes in the market valuation of non-NYSE stocks, which 
comprise more than 60% of the observations in my sample. Also, the NYSE-listed stocks in the 
sample are predominantly rated firms which means that the NYSE percentile measure of size is 
disproportionately based on the risk characteristics of rated firms. Furthermore, the author doesn’t 
scale the unsystematic risk measure in the model, which this study shows is also responsible for 
the pattern in the prediction.  
BLM standardize beta and idiosyncratic risk by dividing them by their cross sectional mean 
each year but that mean is calculated only over the rated sample. This forces the average Beta and 
Idios.Risk of rated firms to have a mean of 1 in all years and, thus, prevents those variables from 
affecting the trend in the measure of rating standards. The market value of equity is, however, 
included in the model without any scaling. BST estimate the specification of BLM as a robustness 
check and show that the main implications regarding rating standards hold in their sample as well. 
This result is driven by the failure to scale the MCap variable.  
In their main specification, BST standardize both beta and idiosyncratic risk as in BLM, 
and those are the only market-based variables that they include in the model. They measure size 
with the book value of assets instead of using market value of equity and do not control for the 
M/B ratio either. However, if we estimate the model using both MCap and M/B as well as the book 





for the effect of total assets. In fact, the book value of assets is insignificant when this specification 
is estimated in the pre-2002 period, while both MCap and M/B are highly significant in either 
period. Therefore, the main specification of BST is suffering from an omitted variable problem 
due to omitting the market value of equity and M/B, which are among the determinants of credit 
ratings but are not orthogonal to the other explanatory variables in the model. As such, the 
estimated coefficients in their main model will be both biased and inconsistent. For example, both 
Alp and BST control for Capex in the credit rating regression and while Alp finds a negative 
coefficient, BST report a positive one. MCap and M/B are both positively correlated to Capex and 
that could explain the positive sign on this variable in BST. The main reason why BST find a 
tightening of credit standards with their specification even after standardizing Beta and Idios.Risk 
is because the book value of assets of rated firms is increasing steadily over the sample period. 
This variable, however, is not the measure of size that CRAs consider when assigning ratings. This 
is also why the authors do not find the structural break in 2002 that Alp reports.  
BST perform another robustness test where they standardize each variable by subtracting 
its cross sectional mean and dividing by its standard deviation on annual basis in the rated sample 
only.  They find that estimating a regression of credit ratings on the standardized variables doesn’t 
affect the trend in the annual dummies. With this standardization, the annual average of each 
control variable is set to zero. Then, the annual intercept for each year t will just be the difference 
between the mean rating in year t and the overall average rating, relative to this difference in 1985. 
Since we know that ratings are decreasing over time, the negative trend in the annual dummies is 





This study includes both rated and unrated firms in the scaling of MCap and Idios.Risk and, 
thus, does not impose any restrictions on the time-series variation in the cross-sectional average of 
these two variables among rated firms. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
With the increased scrutiny and criticism that has befallen rating agencies in recent years, 
the question of whether credit ratings assigned to U.S. public corporations reflect the true 
probability of default is of great interest to both practitioners and regulators. The existing literature 
finds a secular downward trend in credit rating standards indicating that CRAs have become more 
conservative over time. This study questions this claim and finds evidence to the contrary – rating 
standards have remained consistent over the last three decades. 
I show that the measure of rating standards is mainly indicative of conservatism due to the 
variation in the market-based variables in the model. As such, I test whether mispricing in the 
equity market could account, in part, for the apparent tightening of standards in recent years and 
find that this is indeed the case. This paper also advances an alternative specification of the credit 
risk model designed to better capture the observable proxies for default risk that CRAs consider 
and concludes that no tightening of standards has taken place. 
While consistency of rating standards does not translate to rating accuracy, it does allow 
for ratings, on average, to be either consistently precise or consistently imprecise. Furthermore, 
rating changes should reflect variation in the probability of default and, thus, be informative if 
criteria are stable over time. In contrast, the claim by prior studies that ratings decline due to CRAs 





point in the past, inaccurate. The findings of this study assert the consistency and informational 

































The table presents summary statistics (averages, medians, and standard deviations) for the firm-years with and without credit 
rating that have nonmissing financial data. Variable definitions are provided in the appendix (Table A1). 
  Rated   Unrated 
Variable Obs. Mean Median St. Dev.   Obs. Mean Median St. Dev. 
Int. Cov. 23,218 9.03 4.51 15.27   61,329 22.95 6.07 33.23 
Op. Margin 23,218 0.16 0.14 0.13   61,329 0.06 0.09 0.23 
BLev 23,218 0.34 0.32 0.16   61,329 0.21 0.18 0.17 
MCap 23,218 6.81 6.84 1.73   61,329 3.98 3.94 1.81 
M/B 23,218 1.51 1.28 0.77   61,329 1.73 1.34 1.20 
Tangibility 23,218 0.38 0.34 0.24   61,329 0.28 0.22 0.22 
R&D  23,218 0.02 0.00 0.06   61,329 0.05 0.00 0.12 
Cash  23,218 0.08 0.04 0.10   61,329 0.15 0.08 0.17 
RE 23,218 0.13 0.16 0.37   61,329 -0.15 0.12 1.04 
Capex 23,218 0.07 0.05 0.07   61,329 0.07 0.05 0.08 
Dividend  23,218 0.61 1.00 0.49   61,329 0.26 0.00 0.44 
Idios. Risk 23,218 0.02 0.02 0.01   61,329 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Beta 
     
23,218  0.95 0.90 0.51   
     
61,329  0.72 0.64 0.63 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Credit rating models 
The table presents the results of panel regressions of credit rating on firm characteristics and yearly dummies. 
The sample period is 1985-2014 and the annual indicator for the initial year is omitted. The dependent variable 
is S&P long-term issuer credit rating converted into integers with AAA=17 and CCC=1. The explanatory 
variables are defined in the appendix (Table A1). Model (1) is estimated with ordered probit while models 
(2) & (3) are estimated using OLS. Models (1) and (2) also include industry fixed effects based on FF49 
industry classification, while model (3) includes firm fixed effects. The standard errors used to compute t-
statistics (reported in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Coefficient 
estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are identified with *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
  1 2 3 
  Ord. Probit OLS OLS-Firm FE 
        
Int. Cov. 0.00382** 0.00839*** 0.00610*** 
  [2.47] [2.85] [4.15]    
Op. margin 1.221*** 1.489*** 1.850*** 
  [7.00] [5.36] [4.85]    
BLev -2.353*** -3.908*** -3.401*** 
  [-15.17] [-14.60] [-12.43]    
MCap 0.465*** 0.830*** 0.808*** 
  [21.88] [23.62] [17.08]    
M/B 0.128*** 0.281*** -0.144*** 
  [5.05] [5.98] [-3.94]    
Tangibility 0.345*** 0.872*** 1.256*** 
  [2.74] [3.88] [4.25]    
R&D  -0.398 -0.275 0.872 
  [-0.98] [-0.43] [1.13]    
Cash -1.470*** -2.560*** -1.109*** 
  [-7.77] [-7.58] [-3.87]    
RE 0.718*** 1.059*** 0.616*** 
  [7.61] [7.36] [3.81]    
Capex -0.816*** -1.789*** 0.0315 
  [-3.59] [-4.61] [0.10]    
Dividend 0.852*** 1.518*** 0.989*** 
  [18.81] [18.82] [13.17]    
Beta -0.241*** -0.501*** -0.256*** 
  [-7.75] [-9.43] [-6.17]    
Idios. Risk -29.69*** -31.46*** -18.06*** 
  [-15.99] [-10.27] [-8.63]    
        
Industry dummies Yes Yes No 
Firm dummies No No Yes 
N 23218 23218 23218 
adj. R-sq   0.754 0.907 






The RatingDifference and future returns 
The table contains coefficients of OLS panel regressions of the RatingDifference (Panel A) and PredictedRating 
(Panel B) on 1-year future returns and firm-level control variables. The explanatory variables are defined in the 
appendix (Table A1). All specifications include industry fixed effects based on FF49 industry classification. In 
column 1-3 the dependent variable is derived using coefficients estimated on the 1985-1996 period and in columns 
4-6 using coefficients estimated in the 1985-1990 period. All specifications account for calendar year fixed effects 
and the standard errors used to compute t-statistics (the latter reported in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity 
and clustering at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 


















































Panel A.  Regressions of RatingDifference on future returns 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Diff1996 Diff1996 Diff1996 Diff1990 Diff1990 Diff1990 
  1997-2014 1997-2002 2003-2014 1991-2014 1991-2002 2003-2014 
              
Return(t+1) 0.0769*** 0.0441 0.0995*** 0.0454** 0.0103 0.0910*** 
  [3.50] [1.26] [3.49] [2.25] [0.37] [3.11]    
Return(t) -0.944*** -0.993*** -0.908*** -1.087*** -1.117*** -1.070*** 
  [-35.02] [-21.44] [-29.40] [-41.70] [-29.77] [-31.93]    
Return(t-1) 0.0817*** 0.0855** 0.0804*** 0.0938*** 0.123*** 0.0562*   
  [3.14] [2.14] [2.82] [3.79] [3.79] [1.86]    
Rating(t-1) 0.866*** 0.847*** 0.878*** 0.887*** 0.887*** 0.883*** 
  [126.33] [75.36] [124.20] [158.61] [110.96] [121.31]    
Int. Cov.(t-1) -0.000658 0.00153 -0.00175** 0.00469*** 0.00619*** 0.00394*** 
  [-0.65] [0.50] [-2.48] [4.62] [2.59] [5.32]    
Op. Margin(t-1) -1.300*** -1.358*** -1.188*** -1.573*** -1.671*** -1.470*** 
  [-10.05] [-6.63] [-8.50] [-12.39] [-9.48] [-9.46]    
Blev(t-1) 4.238*** 3.886*** 4.324*** 5.474*** 5.377*** 5.540*** 
  [52.80] [22.35] [45.21] [66.84] [35.78] [53.62]    
MCap(t-1) -0.834*** -0.840*** -0.843*** -0.939*** -0.939*** -0.937*** 
  [-81.46] [-50.94] [-82.52] [-109.63] [-80.61] [-89.54]    
M/B(t-1) -0.206*** -0.155*** -0.228*** -0.320*** -0.306*** -0.331*** 
  [-12.14] [-5.58] [-11.03] [-18.15] [-11.27] [-15.47]    
Tangibility(t-1) -0.925*** -0.994*** -0.874*** -0.663*** -0.708*** -0.608*** 
  [-13.73] [-8.32] [-11.20] [-11.35] [-8.61] [-7.23]    
R&D(t-1) -0.223 -1.286** 0.243 0.184 -0.512 0.905**  
  [-0.67] [-2.34] [0.62] [0.51] [-0.80] [2.06]    
Cash(t-1) 1.493*** 1.623*** 1.408*** 2.050*** 2.301*** 1.852*** 
  [12.31] [4.95] [11.49] [16.81] [9.89] [14.07]    
RE(t-1) -3.416*** -3.868*** -3.359*** -3.964*** -4.007*** -3.955*** 
  [-80.47] [-17.45] [-65.40] [-75.04] [-17.46] [-69.00]    
Capex(t-1) 1.750*** 1.404*** 1.932*** 1.530*** 1.443*** 1.602*** 
  [8.93] [4.52] [8.02] [9.38] [6.97] [6.11]    
Dividend(t-1) -1.305*** -1.319*** -1.289*** -1.118*** -1.166*** -1.071*** 
  [-57.49] [-27.28] [-48.78] [-52.44] [-29.72] [-39.98]    
Beta(t-1) 0.351*** 0.426*** 0.297*** 0.341*** 0.306*** 0.303*** 
  [11.98] [5.13] [9.82] [13.74] [6.14] [9.51]    
Idios. Risk(t-1) 16.77*** 10.56*** 18.99*** 16.06*** 13.79*** 18.32*** 
  [10.88] [4.07] [10.55] [11.28] [7.11] [9.63]    
              
N 11476 3445 8031 15196 7165 8031 







Panel B. Regressions of PredictedRating on future returns 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  Pred1996 Pred1996 Pred1996 Pred1990 Pred1990 Pred1990 
  1997-2014 1997-2002 2003-2014 1991-2014 1991-2002 2003-2014 
              
Return(t+1) -0.0740*** -0.0525* -0.0853*** -0.0572*** -0.0390* -0.0771*** 
  [-4.05] [-1.79] [-3.76] [-3.39] [-1.67] [-3.24]    
Return(t) 1.152*** 1.203*** 1.118*** 1.297*** 1.333*** 1.277*** 
  [45.57] [28.35] [40.03] [53.04] [38.03] [41.67]    
Return(t-1) 0.148*** 0.116*** 0.161*** 0.152*** 0.131*** 0.181*** 
  [6.39] [3.25] [6.88] [6.92] [4.58] [7.16]    
Rating(t) 0.286*** 0.301*** 0.272*** 0.278*** 0.266*** 0.285*** 
  [18.27] [9.88] [16.47] [20.02] [12.44] [15.98]    
Rating(t-1) -0.221*** -0.228*** -0.215*** -0.229*** -0.219*** -0.232*** 
  [-14.55] [-8.20] [-13.32] [-17.13] [-11.13] [-13.25]    
Int. Cov.(t-1) 0.000987 -0.000534 0.00158*** -0.00437*** -0.00549** -0.00411*** 
  [1.08] [-0.18] [2.76] [-4.81] [-2.46] [-6.83]    
Op. Margin(t-1) 1.479*** 1.496*** 1.354*** 1.781*** 1.887*** 1.633*** 
  [12.47] [7.40] [10.84] [14.78] [10.98] [11.52]    
BLev(t-1) -4.408*** -4.005*** -4.524*** -5.649*** -5.524*** -5.736*** 
  [-64.28] [-25.26] [-54.79] [-78.07] [-39.48] [-63.27]    
MCap(t-1) 0.899*** 0.905*** 0.910*** 0.997*** 0.987*** 1.003*** 
  [111.12] [63.69] [118.05] [142.79] [98.26] [122.31]    
M/B(t-1) 0.288*** 0.237*** 0.332*** 0.402*** 0.386*** 0.433*** 
  [19.58] [9.51] [19.28] [25.07] [15.00] [23.48]    
Tangibility(t-1) 0.933*** 0.958*** 0.908*** 0.666*** 0.699*** 0.641*** 
  [16.40] [9.53] [13.26] [12.91] [9.77] [8.52]    
R&D(t-1) -0.0742 0.662 -0.454 -0.52 0.0686 -1.112*** 
  [-0.24] [1.15] [-1.33] [-1.43] [0.10] [-2.88]    
Cash(t-1) -1.503*** -1.780*** -1.437*** -2.058*** -2.376*** -1.881*** 
  [-13.44] [-6.01] [-12.62] [-17.91] [-11.14] [-15.16]    
RE(t-1) 3.431*** 3.925*** 3.377*** 3.986*** 4.082*** 3.974*** 
  [95.08] [18.33] [82.40] [79.91] [18.43] [83.43]    
Capex(t-1) -2.017*** -1.719*** -2.162*** -1.704*** -1.599*** -1.827*** 
  [-11.32] [-6.30] [-9.55] [-11.38] [-8.65] [-7.50]    
Dividend(t-1) 1.270*** 1.272*** 1.262*** 1.085*** 1.129*** 1.045*** 
  [59.99] [28.64] [51.14] [55.32] [31.86] [41.52]    
Beta(t-1) -0.382*** -0.434*** -0.305*** -0.363*** -0.305*** -0.311*** 
  [-14.30] [-5.53] [-11.80] [-15.66] [-6.58] [-11.20]    
Idios. Risk(t-1) -23.07*** -17.68*** -24.93*** -22.12*** -20.40*** -24.16*** 
  [-17.46] [-8.77] [-16.33] [-17.12] [-12.04] [-14.49]    
              
N 11476 3445 8031 15196 7165 8031 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2.3 Yearly dummies from rating models






Figure 2.4 Plot of the annual average of RatingDifference derived from a credit rating model estimated either 
on 1985-1996 or 1985 – 1990 period.  
 
 
Figure 2.5 Plot of the annual average of PredictedRating derived from a credit rating model estimated either on 


















Figure 2.5 PredictedRating and actual rating




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figures 2.20 The average MCap and Idios.Risk of rated firms over time. . MCap is measured on the left vertical 


































































































































































Figures 2.21 The average PredictedRating of rated and unrated firms over time. PredictedRating is derived using 
a credit rating model estimated either on 1985-1996 or 1985-1990 period. PredictedRating of rated firms is 























Figure 2.21 PredictedRating of rated and unrated firms






Figures 2.22 The average MCap of rated and unrated firms over time. MCap of rated firms is measured on the 
left vertical axis and MCap of unrated firms on the right vertical axis. 
 











































































































































Figure 2.22 MCap of rated and unrated firms
































































































































Figure 2.23 Idios.Risk of rated and unrated firms







Figures 2.24 The average scaled MCap and scaled Idios.Risk of rated firms over time. Scaled MCap is measured 


























































































































































Figure 2.24 Scaled MCap and Idios.Risk of rated firms 






Figures 2.25 Plot of the coefficients on the yearly indicator variables using the three models in Table 2.3 with 
both scaled and unscaled MCap and Idios.Risk. 
 
Figures 2.26  Plot of the annual average of RatingDifference derived from a credit rating model estimated either 

































































































































Figure 2.25 Yearly Dummies with and without scaled MCap & Idios.Risk









Figure 2.26 RatingDifference with and without scaled MCap & Idios.Risk 













Interest Coverage The three-year average of: operating income after depreciation (oiadp) plus interest 
expense (xint), divided by interest expense.  
 
Operating Margin The three-year average of: operating income before depreciation (oibdp)  divided 
by sales (sale).  
 
Book Leverage The three-year average of: long-term debt (dltt) plus short-term debt (dlc), divided 
by assets (at). 
 
Market Cap The natural log of the market value of equity (MVE), adjusted for inflation. MVE is 
price (prcc_f)*shares outstanding (csho) 
 
M/B The ratio of (total assets (at) – book value of equity + MVE) to total assests (at). 
Book value of equity is obtained as total assets (at) – long-term debt (dltt) – 
preferred stock (pstkl) + deferred taxes and investment tax credit (txditc). 
 
Tangibility Property, plant, and equipment (ppent) to assets (at). 
 
R&D expense Research and development expense (xrd) divided by assets (at). Set to zero if data 
is missing 
 
Cash  Cash and short-term investments (che) to assets (at) 
 
Retained Earnings Retained earnings (re) to assets (at) 
 
Capex Capital expenditures (capx) to assets (at) 
 
Dividend payer Equals 1 if the firm has positive dividends per share (dvpsx_f) 
 
Idiosyncratic Risk The root mean squared error from a CAPM regression of a firm's daily stock return 
on the CRSP index return each year. A minimum of 50 observations in a calendar 
year are required. 
 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Explanatory power of the model and RatingDifference 
 
Panel A of this table contains the adjusted R-squared from cross-sectional regressions of the credit rating model estimated 
with OLS and industry fixed effects each year as well as the annual average of RatingDifference1996 and 
RatingDifference1990. Panel B contains the estimated coefficients from a time-series regression of the adjusted R-squared 
on the two RatiingDifference variables. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level 
are identified with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Panel A   Panel B 
yr Adjusted R2 Diff1996 Diff1990     1997-2014 1991-2014 
            Adj. R-squared Adj. R-squared 
1985 0.74           
1986 0.76             
1987 0.77       Diff1996 0.0169**                 
1988 0.79         [2.82]                 
1989 0.79             
1990 0.77       Diff1990   0.0121*** 
1991 0.76   -0.02       [2.98]    
1992 0.77   -0.04         
1993 0.77   -0.18   _cons 0.784*** 0.778*** 
1994 0.79   -0.13     [88.72] [136.68] 
1995 0.77   -0.40         
1996 0.76   -0.58   N 18 24 
1997 0.76 -0.59 -0.78         
1998 0.78 -0.35 -0.54         
1999 0.80 -0.52 -0.70         
2000 0.78 -0.50 -0.71         
2001 0.77 -0.60 -0.77         
2002 0.78 -0.38 -0.48         
2003 0.75 -1.14 -1.27         
2004 0.75 -1.54 -1.68         
2005 0.74 -1.77 -1.93         
2006 0.73 -2.13 -2.33         
2007 0.72 -2.13 -2.32         
2008 0.76 -1.05 -1.20         
2009 0.75 -1.50 -1.67         
2010 0.76 -1.79 -1.90         
2011 0.77 -1.67 -1.79         
2012 0.78 -1.84 -1.96         
2013 0.77 -2.15 -2.31         





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































What lies behind the heterogeneity in observed capital structure choices across firms has 
been the topic of investigation of a myriad of studies in the corporate finance literature. Following 
the seminal work of Modigliani and Miller (1958), different theories of capital structure have been 
developed and tested. The static tradeoff model argues that observed leverage ratios are the result 
of firms trading off the tax benefits against the bankruptcy costs of debt financing. Empirical tests 
of this theory rely mainly on the association between leverage ratios and various firm 
characteristics and find that it is not fully consistent with firm behavior. To account for those 
inconsistencies, the literature has advanced a dynamic version of the tradeoff model where firms 
face significant recapitalization costs. The dynamic model allows for short term deviations from 
the optimal capital structure position with firms adjusting to target only when the value lost due to 
being off-target becomes higher than the costs incurred in recapitalization. Empirical evidence 
suggests that firms actively manage their debt ratios to maintain an optimal leverage (Graham and 
Harvey, 2001; Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001; Leary and Roberts, 2005; Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006).  
Other dynamic views of capital structure have also emerged in an attempt to account for 





Sunder and Myers, 1999) claims that firms face adverse selection costs of security issuance and 
thus prefer internal to external financing, as well as debt to equity financing when raising capital 
is necessary. Baker and Wurgler (2002) argue that observed leverage ratios are the result of 
managers’ efforts to time the market. While both theories can account for certain patterns in the 
data, neither provides a comprehensive explanation for the observed capital structure choices of 
the firm, and both pecking order and market timing have faced criticism in the literature.1 As 
Graham and Leary (2011) point out in their review of the empirical capital structure literature: 
“Any decision that a company makes can be viewed as trading off some costs and benefits. A 
broad enough interpretation of the tradeoff theory may then be impossible to reject. In our view, 
the real question is which economic forces are most important to capital structure choices.”   
The goal of the present study is to identify the main determinants of the optimal capital 
structure by reexamining the interpretation of the conventional set of explanatory variables used 
as proxies for the costs and benefits of debt in the context of the dynamic tradeoff theory. In the 
presence of significant adjustment costs, the firm's leverage ratio at any point in time is comprised 
of the sum of its target and the deviation from the target which has not been offset. As such, some 
of the explanatory variables in the traditional leverage regression will derive their significance 
from determining the optimal leverage and others from driving the deviation. In this study, I 
employ an empirical approach designed to distinguish between those two types of variables and, 
in doing so, address the question posed by Graham and Leary (2011). 
Prior studies compare the theoretical implications of the tradeoff model to the observed 
correlation between leverage and the firm-level proxies to differentiate the determinants of the 
target from those causing the deviation. In contrast, my empirical approach aims to eliminate the 
                                                          





cross-sectional variation in leverage that is due to the deviation by aggregating the data across a 
dimension identifying firms with similar targets.  Estimating the traditional leverage regression on 
the aggregated data will provide a test of the theoretical priors and further our understanding of 
the costs and benefits of debt financing. I investigate two possible candidates for aggregation, 
industry classification and credit rating category, and find that firms with the same rating are more 
likely to have similar targets than firms in the same industry. Then, I examine the determinants of 
the variation in leverage across rating categories and find that, in contrast to the predictions of 
tradeoff theory, large and profitable firms with lower operating risk have lower optimal debt ratios. 
I also observe that, while firm characteristics can only explain approximately one fifth of the 
variation in leverage in the firm-year panel, they account for close to 90% of the cross-rating 
variation, with size and profitability being the most important determinants.  
I propose an explanation for the puzzling correlation between the optimal debt ratio and 
firm characteristics that adds credit rating considerations to the traditional tax benefits and 
bankruptcy costs of debt financing. More specifically, I argue that the set of explanatory variables 
in the leverage regression also proxy for the non-financial risk of the firm and that rated firms with 
lower non-financial risk derive a benefit from limiting the use of debt in their capital structure to 
improve their credit rating which causes a positive correlation between target leverage and non-
financial risk. Regressions of credit rating on leverage and the control variables reveal that large 
and profitable firms with lower operating risk are assigned better credit ratings for any level of 
debt and, thus, have lower non-financial risk. If those firms derive the largest benefit from being 
highly rated, then we could observe the negative effect of size and profitability (and positive effect 





As an additional test of the proposed explanation, I study the effect of non-financial risk 
on the financing choices of firms without a credit rating. Since the credit rating benefit is only 
derived by rated firm, I expect unrated firms with higher non-financial risk to have lower leverage 
as postulated by the traditional tradeoff theory. I derive a proxy for non-financial risk as the fitted 
value from the regression of ratings on leverage and firm characteristics, subtracting the effect of 
leverage. Confirming the implications of the proposed theory, I show that the measure of non-
financial risk is strongly positively correlated to leverage in the sample of firms with credit rating 
while this is not the case among unrated firms. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data and empirical 
strategy. Section 3.3 presents the results and implications of leverage regressions in the data 
aggregated by credit rating and year. Section 3.4 compares the relation between non-financial risk 
and leverage in the rated sample to that of the unrated sample and Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2 Data and empirical strategy 
The estimation of the firm’s unobserved target is a central issue in the literature that aims 
to test the validity of the dynamic tradeoff theory.2 To arrive at a proxy for the optimal debt ratio, 
most studies utilize the fitted value from a regression of observed leverage on a set of firm 
characteristics that are believed to capture the costs and benefits of debt financing as postulated by 
the theory. Hovakimian et.al. (2001) first regress leverage on the conventional set of variables 
identified as important determinants of capital structure and then exclude the ones whose 
coefficient has a sign that is inconsistent with theoretical predictions from the estimation of the 
                                                          
2 See Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Hovakimian and Li (2011), Fama and French (2002), 






target as those variables are assumed to proxy for the deviation from the target instead. For 
example, more profitable firms are likely to have more valuable assets in place and to gain more 
from the tax shields provided by debt financing, resulting in a higher target. On the other hand, 
profitability could also be related to the deviation from the target if firms passively accumulate 
retained earning when they are profitable. Since the coefficient on profitability is negative in the 
leverage regression, the variable has been assumed to proxy for the deviation. However, it is also 
possible for profitability to be related to an omitted variable that is negatively related to the target. 
I allow for that possibility by taking a different approach to the estimation of the unobserved target 
that allows us to reexamine the interpretation of the conventional set of firm characteristics as 
determinants of the optimal capital structure.  
In particular, the empirical strategy employed in this study aims to isolate the cross-
sectional variation in leverage that is due to differences in the target from the variation caused by 
deviations by aggregating the data across a dimension that identifies firms with similar targets. As 
firms in each target group will be either above or below their optimal leverage ratio due to 
adjustment costs, this deviation will cancel out in the calculation of the average(median) leverage 
and provide an estimate of the target debt ratio for that group. Estimating the traditional leverage 
regression on the aggregated data should provide us with a better understanding of how the 
independent variables relate to the optimal capital structure choice. 
The literature identifies two candidates for classifying firms with similar targets - industry 
classification and credit rating category. Firms in the same business environment (industry) are 
subject to similar market frictions and, thus, are likely to face similar trade-offs when it comes to 
capital structure decisions. Prior studies have shown that industry leverage is one of the most 





and Zender, 2008) and that firms adjust towards the industry median when making the choice 
between debt and equity issuance (Hovakimian et. al., 2001).  
Aggregating the data based on credit rating category could also provide us with an estimate 
of the firm’s target as evidence suggests that firms consider their target rating in the capital 
structure determination process (Graham and Harvey, 2001; Kisgen, 2006; Kisgen, 2009). As a 
measure of the probability of default, credit ratings play an important role in the investment and 
financing choices of the firm by affecting its cost of capital, investor base, and access to external 
financing. As firms balance the costs and benefits of debt financing they will choose a capital 
structure and, thus, probability of default that maximizes value. While shocks could drive leverage 
above or below the optimal ratio, if the deviation becomes significant enough to cause a downgrade 
or an upgrade, the firm will adjust leverage to remain within its target rating. However, we should 
note that firms with different targets can, theoretically, end up in the same rating category. For 
example, a firm with high non-financial (asset) risk and low leverage and a firm with low non-
financial (asset) risk and high leverage could get the same credit rating. Then, we would observe 
little variation in the average leverage across ratings and aggregating the data across rating 
categories would not provide us with a meaningful measure of the target. It is an empirical question 
whether industry or rating classification is more likely to identify firms with similar targets. 
 The data for this study comes from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database which 
provides annual firm-level financial statement data and the stock return data is gathered from 
CRSP. I require nonmissing values for all relevant variables and exclude financial firms (primary 
one digit SIC code of 6) as well as those with values of total assets or sales less than one million 
dollars from the sample. To mitigate the effect of outliers and incorrectly recorded data, I limit the 





the variable takes on negative values, bottom one percent as well. Firms are aggregated on the 
industry level based on Fama and French's 49 industry classification. The credit rating category is 
S&P long-term issuer rating converted into numerical scale with AAA =16 and CCC=1. I pool 
together CCC-, CCC, and CCC+ rated firms into the lowest rating category and drop the firms 
with ratings indicating default. I also combine AAA and AA into the highest category, 16, as there 
are few firms in those two rating groups. The final dataset covers the period from 1985 to 2015 
and consists of 21,443 observations for firms with credit rating and 67,024 observation for unrated 
firms.  
The analysis presented in this study is based on the firm’s book leverage ratio, BLev, which 
is the sum of long-term and short-term debt, divided by total assets.3 The selection of the 
explanatory variables is informed by prior studies and includes the conventional set of firm 
characteristics that have been shown to be among the most reliable leverage determinants. In 
particular, I use the following: Size, measured as the natural logarithm of the inflation adjusted 
level of sales; M/B, defined as the ratio of market value of assets to total assets; Tangibility, which 
is the ratio of net property, plant and equipment to total assets; Profitability, calculated as operating 
income before depreciation to total assets; R&D, defined as R&D expense divided by sales; R&D 
dummy, an indicator variable equal to one when R&D is not missing; Expense, which is selling, 
general and administrative expense divided by sales; Age, measured as the natural log of the age 
of the firm on Compustat; and Operating Risk, which is the standard deviation of profitability over 
the past four or five years.  
                                                          
3 Focusing on book leverage is justified given the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) who report that 
executives focus on book values when determining the capital structure of the firm. Furthermore, Barclay, 
Morellec, and Smith (2006) show how book leverage is theoretically preferable in regressions of financial 
leverage, arguing that using market values in the denominator might spuriously correlate with explanatory 






I begin the empirical analysis by investigating whether industry or credit rating 
classification is more likely to identify firms with similar targets. If we group together firms with 
the same optimal capital structure, we expect the variation in leverage within each group to be 
lower than it is in the full sample and we expect the variation in the average(median) leverage 
across groups to be significant. In Table 3.1, I compare the within- and across-group variation in 
leverage based on either rating or industry classification. The within-rating variation in leverage is 
lower than the within-industry variation, while the standard deviation of the average (median) 
leverage across ratings is higher than it is across industries.  Furthermore, in Table 3.2, I compare 
the explanatory power of rating fixed effects to that of industry fixed effects. In column 1, I 
estimate a regression of leverage on the set of firm characteristics described above and find that 
only 21% of the variation is explained by those variables. Rating fixed effects by themselves 
account for 30% of the variation in leverage (column 2) and add 13% to the adjusted R-squared 
when added to the control variables (column 4). Industry fixed effects, on the other hand, only 
explain 13% of the variation in leverage by themselves (column 3) and increase the adjusted R-
squared by 7% when added to the controls (column 5).  Column 6 contains the R-squared of a 
specification that includes both industry and rating fixed effects as well as the firm-level variables. 
Adding industry FE to the specification in column 4 improves the explanatory power by 6%, while 
adding rating FE to the specification in column 5 increases the R-squared by 12%. Based on the 
results presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we can conclude that aggregating the data across credit 
rating categories will provide a better estimate of the target debt ratio of the firms in that category. 
The following section analyzes the aggregated data to determine how the conventional set of 






3.3 The determinants of the optimal capital structure 
The main analysis of this paper is based on the data aggregated by credit rating category. 
For each of the 16 rating groups, I calculate the mean and median of all relevant variables each 
year. Table 3.3 contains the time-series averages of the mean (Panel A) and median (Panel B) 
characteristics by rating category. Firms with better credit ratings have lower leverage and, as 
reported in the previous section, there is significant variation in the average (median) debt ratio 
across rating categories ranging from 0.58 for the lowest rating group to 0.14 for the highest. 
Furthermore, firms with higher rating are larger, older, more profitable, spend more on R&D, have 
higher M/B and lower operating risk.  
 In Table 3.4, I report the results from estimating the traditional leverage regression in the 
rating-year panel. I first look at the effect of each variable on leverage in univariate regressions 
and report the multivariate results in the last column of each panel. I estimate the model with either 
OLS (Panels A and C) or Fama-MacBeth (Panels B and D) and use either means (Panels A and B) 
or medians (Panels C and D).  We should first note that while firm characteristics could only 
explain about one fifth of the variation in leverage in the firm-year panel, they account for close 
to 90% of the variation in the aggregated panel, with Size and Profitability being the most 
important determinants of the optimal leverage ratio. Furthermore, the sign of some of the 
explanatory variables is inconsistent with theoretical priors. Based on the traditional trade-off 
theory, we expect Size, Profitability, Tangibility, and Age to be positively correlated with the 
optimal capital structure and M/B, R&D, Expense and Operating Risk to have a negative effect.4 
While Tangibility, R&D and Age either have the expected sign or are insignificant, Size and 
Profitability enter the leverage regression with a negative and highly significant sign in all 
                                                          





specifications. Furthermore, the remaining three variables also have a sign that is inconsistent with 
theoretical priors, albeit not consistently statistically significant. These puzzling results raise the 
question of whether our understanding of the cost and benefits of debt financing, as proxied by the 
explanatory variables, is complete. Next, I examine the reasons why large and profitable firms 
with low operating risk might have lower target debt ratios.  
Given that the sample under investigation consists of only firms with a credit rating, a 
possible explanation for the results in Table 3.4 could be derived from a theory that adds credit 
rating considerations to the traditional tax benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt financing – I call 
this the “augmented” tradeoff theory. More specifically, this study argues that size, profitability, 
operating risk and M/B all proxy for the non-financial risk of the firm (NF_Risk) and that firms 
with lower NF_Risk derive a benefit from lowering leverage to achieve a better credit rating and 
thus have lower targets. Firms have different levels of non-financial risk which increases the 
probability of default for any level of leverage. Per the traditional tradeoff model, any factor that 
contributes to the non-financial risk of the firm should, ceteris paribus, be negatively correlated 
with the optimal debt ratio as it increases the risk of bankruptcy. However, adding a credit rating 
benefit that is increasing as non-financial risk decreases could result in a positive correlation 
between NF_Risk and the optimal leverage ratio. The rest of this paper presents evidence in support 
of the “augmented” tradeoff theory.  
 I first show that the proxies utilized in the traditional leverage regression are correlated 
with the probability of default, holding leverage constant. I estimate regressions of credit rating on 
leverage and the control variables and report the resulting coefficients in Table 3.5. Column 1 is 
estimated with OLS and column 2 with ordered probit and both control for industry and year fixed 





to credit risk and we control for financial risk with leverage, the coefficients represent the effect 
of each variable on NF_Risk. Consistent with expectations, NF_Risk is decreasing with Size, M/B, 
Tangibility, Profitability, Expense and Age and is increasing with R&D and Operating Risk. If we 
refer to the summary statistics in Table 3.3, we see that both leverage and most of the factors 
comprising NF_Risk are decreasing as the rating improves. The positive effect of NF_Risk on the 
optimal debt ratio cannot be explained by the traditional tradeoff theory but is consistent with the 
hypothesized “augmented” tradeoff. 
 It is also possible that there is an unobserved industry-specific factor that is causing the 
positive correlation between non-financial risk and leverage. This could arise if highly rated firms 
are concentrated in low leverage industries and firms with lower credit rating come mostly from 
industries where high leverage is observed. If that is indeed the case, then we expect the average 
leverage of the unrated firms in the industry of highly rated firms to be lower than the leverage of 
the unrated firms in the industry of low rated firms. To examine this possibility, for each rated 
firm, I compute the average (median) leverage of the firms without rating in the same industry and 
report the mean of this variable by rating category in Table 3.6.  The leverage of unrated firms 
from the same industry is stable across rating categories and, therefore, industry effects cannot 
account for the results presented above. In the following section, this study extends the analysis to 
the sample of unrated firms and compares the correlation between leverage and non-financial risk 
in the two subsamples. 
 
3.4 Non-financial risk and leverage – rated vs unrated firms 
To compare the determinants of capital structure across firms with and without credit 





and the sample of unrated firms and report the coefficients in Table 3.7. While Size determines the 
firm’s access to the public debt market, it is negatively correlated to leverage in the rated sample 
and insignificant in the unrated one. The signs of the remaining variables are consistent across the 
three samples. 
Since unrated firms don’t have the credit rating benefit consideration, their optimal 
leverage ratio will only be determined by the traditional tradeoff between tax benefits and 
bankruptcy costs. As such, the target of unrated firms will be increasing with tax benefits, 
decreasing with bankruptcy costs and decreasing with NF_Risk, while the optimal debt ratio of 
rated firms will also be increasing with tax benefits and decreasing with bankruptcy costs but 
increasing with NF_Risk. This statement provides a testable implication of the “augmented” 
tradeoff theory as it postulates differential effect of non-financial risk on the target leverage in the 
rated and unrated sample.  
To derive a proxy for NF_Risk for each firm in the full sample, I first estimate a regression 
of credit rating on leverage and the firm-level control variables as in Table 3.5, and then compute 
the fitted value for each rated and unrated firm (PredictedRating) using the estimated coefficients. 
Assuming that the explanatory variables affect the credit risk of unrated firms in the same way 
they do that of rated firms, the fitted value provides us with a measure of the probability of default 
for each firm without a credit rating. Then, for each year t and firm i, I compute a proxy for non-
financial risk as: 
 






I expect the target leverage to be positively correlated to this measure in the rated sample and 
negatively correlated in the unrated sample. However, since I cannot isolate the target of firms 
without a credit rating from the deviation, I will instead examine the correlation between the 
NF_Risk measure and observed leverage in the two samples.  
 
(2)          𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝛼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑁𝐹_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖.𝑡
𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                   
(3)          𝐵𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖,𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 = 𝛼𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛽𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 ∗ 𝑁𝐹_𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖.𝑡
𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                    
 
Given that the NF_Risk measure is a linear combination of all explanatory variables in the leverage 
regression, it will be correlated with the factors that drive the deviation from the target. In 
particular, NF_Risk is decreasing with profitability and M/B and, more profitable firms with higher 
M/B ratios are also more likely to have below target leverage. As such, the NF_Risk variable will 
be positively correlated to the deviation from the target in both samples and, thus, we could observe 
a positive 𝛽𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 in model (3) even though the variable has a negative effect on the firm’s target 
leverage. However, we should still find that 𝛽𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 < 𝛽𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑. 
 Based on the estimated measure of non-financial risk, I assign rated firms into 20 portfolios 
and unrated firms into 20 portfolios each year. Table 3.8 reports the average and median leverage 
and firm characteristics for each portfolio. Consistent with our expectations, Panels A and B show 
that leverage is increasing monotonically with NF_Risk in the sample of firms with credit rating. 
In Panels C and D, we find that this is not the case among unrated firms. Leverage is mostly stable 
across the 20 portfolios apart from the one containing firms with the lowest NF_Risk where 
leverage is significantly lower. In the last two columns of Panel C, I also report the percentage of 





credit rating in any of the previous 3 years. The lowest NF_Risk portfolio is also the one with the 
highest percentage of firms to acquire a rating in the future and this could partially account for the 
low leverage of that category. 
I proceed by estimating models (2) and (3) and report the results in Table 3.9. While the 
correlation between NF_Risk and leverage is positive in both the rated and unrated sample, it is 
significantly higher for firms with a credit rating. In fact, the  𝛽𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 coefficient is only 
significant at the 10% level. Furthermore, in columns 3 and 4 (5 and 6) of the table I exclude the 
firms from the lowest NF_Risk portfolio (the two lowest NF risk portfolios) from both samples 
and find that the NF_Risk coefficient remains positive for rated firms but becomes significantly 
negative among the firms without a rating.  
I also split the rated and unrated samples into 50 portfolios based on the NF_Risk variable 
and estimate a regression of leverage on the 50 portfolio dummies. Figure 3.1 plots those 
coefficients for the rated and unrated sample. Consistent with the previous findings, we see that 
leverage is increasing in non-financial risk in the rated sample (45 of the 50 coefficients are 
significantly positive and 5 are insignificant) while the leverage of unrated firms is mostly 




The capital structure literature has developed different theories that can explain the 
observed correlations between debt ratios and a set of firm characteristics identified as important 
predictors of leverage. The most comprehensive one is the dynamic tradeoff model, which 





costs of debt financing, but, due to significant recapitalization costs, leverage could deviate from 
that optimal level and such deviations will not be offset immediately. Thus, the presence of 
adjustment costs could account for the fact that certain coefficients in the traditional leverage 
regression are not consistent with expectations. For example, the negative correlation between 
leverage and profitability has been explained with the tendency of firms to passively accumulate 
retained earnings and, thus, profitability has been assumed to proxy for the deviation from the 
target leverage.  
In this study, I reexamine the interpretation of the conventional set of variables used as 
proxies for the costs and benefits of debt in the context of the dynamic tradeoff theory. To isolate 
the cross-sectional variation in leverage due to differences in the target from the variation caused 
by deviations, I aggregate the data based on credit rating category. I argue that firms with the same 
credit rating have similar targets and, thus, the average (median) leverage of each rating group 
provides an estimate of the optimal debt ratio for firms in that group and that the determinants of 
the cross-rating variation in leverage will improve our understanding of how firm characteristics 
relate to the target. 
Estimating the leverage regression on the rating-year panel, I find that large and profitable 
firms and those with lower operating risk have lower targets, which is inconsistent with the 
implications of the traditional tradeoff model. I show that those variables also proxy for non-
financial (asset) risk by estimating a model of credit rating on firm characteristics, holding leverage 
constant. Specifically, firms with the same leverage ratio have better credit ratings if they are 
larger, more profitable and have lower operating risk. Thus, while theoretical priors predict a 





I provide an explanation for this puzzling result that adds credit rating considerations to the 
tax benefits and bankruptcy costs of debt that the firm trades off in the determination of its capital 
structure. While firms from all non-financial (asset) risk classes could achieve any credit rating 
they desire by adjusting their leverage ratio, I find that only low risk firms choose to benefit from 
a better credit rating by lowering leverage and thus forgoing tax shield benefits. In other words, 
firms can increase value by targeting a better credit rating but this benefit exists only at the higher 
end of ratings or, alternatively, is increasing in the rating, and is, thus, more relevant for firms with 
lower non-financial risk, which size and profitability proxy for. 
Furthermore, while firm characteristics in the traditional leverage regression can only 
jointly explain about 20% of the variation in debt ratios across firms, the heterogeneity in leverage 
across rating categories is to a much larger extent determined by our proxies as the explanatory 

















Within and across group variation in leverage 
 
The table compares the within and across group variation in leverage where firms are grouped either by their credit 
rating or industry classification. The credit rating is S&P long-term issuer rating converted into numerical scale. 
CCC-, CCC, and CCC+ rated firms are combined in the lowest rating category and AAA and AA into the highest 
category, resulting in 16 groups. Industry is defined based on Fama and French's 49 industry classification and 
financial firms are excluded from the sample. 
  
St.Dev. Of 





St.Dev. Of the 
mean leverage 
across groups 
St.Dev. Of the 
median leverage 
across groups #groups 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Group:           
Rating 0.18 0.14 0.13 0.14 16 




Explanatory power of different models 
 
The table reports the adjusted R-squared from regressions of book leverage on firm characteristics (column 1); 
rating fixed effects (column 2); industry fixed effects (column 3) or combinations of the above (columns 4-6). The 
credit rating is S&P long-term issuer rating converted into numerical scale. CCC-, CCC, and CCC+ rated firms are 
combined in the lowest rating category and AAA and AA into the highest category, resulting in 16 groups. Industry 
is defined based on Fama and French's 49 industry classification and financial firms are excluded from the sample. 
All specifications include calendar year fixed effects. 
















  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Controls Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rating FE No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Ind. FE No No Yes No Yes Yes 
              
N 21443 21443 21443 21443 21443 21443 












Summary statistics by credit rating category 
 
The table reports the average (Panel A) and median (Panel B) firm characteristics by credit rating category. Credit 
rating is S&P long-term issuer rating converted into numerical scale. CCC-, CCC, and CCC+ rated firms are 
combined in the lowest rating category and AAA and AA into the highest category, resulting in 16 groups.  
Panel A. Mean characteristics 
Rating BLev Size MB Tng Profi R&D Expense Age Op.Risk 
                    
1-CCC 0.58 5.58 1.26 0.40 0.05 0.02 0.25 2.82 0.08 
2 0.52 5.90 1.33 0.37 0.06 0.03 0.24 2.85 0.07 
3 0.50 5.90 1.29 0.38 0.10 0.03 0.22 2.75 0.07 
4 0.46 5.94 1.34 0.33 0.12 0.02 0.20 2.73 0.06 
5 0.41 6.41 1.40 0.34 0.14 0.02 0.18 2.82 0.06 
6 0.37 6.73 1.45 0.34 0.15 0.01 0.18 2.93 0.05 
7 0.32 7.12 1.50 0.34 0.15 0.02 0.18 3.09 0.05 
8 0.29 7.56 1.53 0.33 0.15 0.01 0.18 3.21 0.04 
9 0.29 7.59 1.59 0.35 0.16 0.02 0.18 3.31 0.04 
10 0.28 7.70 1.75 0.35 0.17 0.02 0.19 3.35 0.04 
11 0.25 7.88 1.82 0.34 0.17 0.03 0.20 3.43 0.04 
12 0.25 8.12 1.95 0.34 0.18 0.03 0.21 3.53 0.03 
13 0.23 8.27 2.12 0.34 0.20 0.03 0.25 3.58 0.03 
14 0.21 8.56 2.26 0.35 0.21 0.03 0.22 3.63 0.03 
15 0.20 8.95 2.36 0.40 0.21 0.04 0.26 3.59 0.03 
16-AAA 0.14 9.08 2.64 0.36 0.24 0.06 0.29 3.63 0.03 
 
Panel B. Median characteristics 
Rating BLev Size MB Tng Profi R&D Expense Age Op.Risk 
                    
1 - CCC 0.58 5.51 1.11 0.35 0.06 0.00 0.20 2.77 0.06 
2 0.51 5.85 1.14 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.19 2.83 0.05 
3 0.49 5.77 1.15 0.34 0.10 0.00 0.16 2.71 0.05 
4 0.46 5.84 1.18 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.17 2.71 0.05 
5 0.39 6.32 1.23 0.27 0.13 0.00 0.15 2.83 0.04 
6 0.34 6.68 1.28 0.27 0.13 0.00 0.15 2.94 0.04 
7 0.32 7.04 1.33 0.29 0.14 0.00 0.15 3.14 0.04 
8 0.29 7.50 1.31 0.28 0.13 0.00 0.15 3.33 0.03 
9 0.28 7.44 1.40 0.30 0.15 0.00 0.15 3.47 0.03 
10 0.27 7.58 1.54 0.29 0.16 0.00 0.16 3.50 0.03 
11 0.25 7.89 1.50 0.29 0.16 0.00 0.18 3.64 0.03 
12 0.24 8.13 1.65 0.30 0.18 0.01 0.19 3.69 0.02 
13 0.23 8.29 1.95 0.32 0.19 0.01 0.23 3.66 0.02 
14 0.20 8.70 1.96 0.31 0.21 0.01 0.20 3.69 0.03 
15 0.20 8.85 1.95 0.37 0.21 0.02 0.22 3.66 0.02 
16-AAA 0.13 8.97 2.32 0.31 0.24 0.07 0.30 3.71 0.02 
 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































                              
 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The determinants of credit risk 
 
The table presents the results of panel regressions of credit rating on leverage and firm characteristics. The 
dependent variable is S&P long-term issuer credit rating converted into integers with AAA=17 and CCC=1. Model 
(1) is estimated with OLS while Model (2) is estimated using OLS. Both specifications also include industry fixed 
effects based on FF49 industry classification and account for calendar year fixed effects. The standard errors used 
to compute t-statistics (the latter reported in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm 
level.. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are identified with *, 
**, and ***, respectively.  
  1 2 
      
BLev -5.413*** -2.783*** 
  [-22.34] [-23.67]    
      
Size 1.068*** 0.522*** 
  [27.21] [22.89]    
      
M/B 0.616*** 0.284*** 
  [11.09] [10.42]    
      
Tng 1.476*** 0.677*** 
  [5.81] [5.44]    
      
Profi 5.437*** 2.980*** 
  [13.09] [14.30]    
      
R&D -1.468 -0.904*   
  [-1.59] [-1.95]    
      
R&D dummy 0.117 0.0485 
  [1.11] [0.95]    
      
Expense 2.180*** 0.946*** 
  [5.52] [4.83]    
      
Age 0.473*** 0.206*** 
  [7.29] [6.58]    
      
Op.Risk -10.26*** -5.256*** 
  [-13.73] [-14.30]    
      
N 21443 21443 
adj. R-sq 0.672                 






Leverage of unrated firms in the same industry 
 
The table presents the average and median leverage of unrated firms in the same industry as rated firms by rating 
category. Credit rating is S&P long-term issuer rating converted into numerical scale. CCC-, CCC, and CCC+ rated 
firms are combined in the lowest rating category and AAA and AA into the highest category, resulting in 16 groups. 
Industry is defined based on Fama and French's 49 industry classification and financial firms are excluded from the 
sample. For each rated firm the average and median leverage of the firms without rating in the same industry is 
computed and the table reports the means of those variables by rating category.  
Rating 
Average Leverage of rated 
firms 
Average Leverage of unrated 
in the same industry 
Median Leverage of unrated 
in the same industry 
  1 2 3 
        
1-CCC 0.58 0.24 0.21 
2 0.52 0.22 0.18 
3 0.50 0.22 0.18 
4 0.46 0.23 0.19 
5 0.41 0.21 0.17 
6 0.37 0.22 0.19 
7 0.32 0.22 0.18 
8 0.29 0.21 0.18 
9 0.29 0.22 0.18 
10 0.28 0.22 0.18 
11 0.25 0.22 0.19 
12 0.25 0.22 0.18 
13 0.23 0.22 0.18 
14 0.21 0.23 0.19 
15 0.20 0.23 0.20 

















The traditional leverage regression - rated vs unrated sample 
 
The table contains coefficients from the traditional leverage regression estimated on the full sample (column 1), the 
firm-years with credit rating (column 2) and the firm-years without credit rating (column 3). The specifications also 
include industry fixed effects based on FF49 industry classification and account for calendar year fixed effects. The 
standard errors used to compute t-statistics (the latter reported in brackets) are robust to heteroskedasticity and 
clustering at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are 
identified with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  Full Sample Rated firms Unrated firms 
  1 2 3 
        
Size 0.0135*** -0.0349*** 0.000155 
  [12.81] [-13.22] [0.12]    
        
M/B -0.0115*** -0.0166*** -0.00848*** 
  [-10.11] [-4.80] [-7.83]    
        
Tng 0.214*** 0.106*** 0.232*** 
  [19.55] [5.89] [19.59]    
        
Profi -0.272*** -0.176*** -0.266*** 
  [-26.81] [-6.89] [-25.86]    
        
R&D -0.134*** -0.269*** -0.102*** 
  [-5.05] [-3.84] [-3.80]    
        
R&D dummy -0.0333*** -0.0124 -0.0324*** 
  [-7.36] [-1.53] [-6.83]    
        
Expense -0.0809*** -0.0248 -0.0962*** 
  [-7.17] [-0.81] [-8.59]    
        
Age -0.0217*** -0.0231*** -0.0182*** 
  [-7.75] [-4.70] [-5.99]    
        
Op.Risk 0.0392* 0.230*** 0.0371*   
  [1.77] [4.16] [1.65]    
        
N 88467 21443 67024 









Summary statistics by NF_Risk portfolio 
 
The table reports the average and median firm characteristics by NF_Risk portfolio. Each year the rated and unrated 
samples are split into 20 portfolios based on the measure of non-financial risk. Panels A and B report summary 
statistics for rated firms while Panels C and D for firms without credit rating. 
Panel A. Rated Firms - Means 
NF Risk portfolio Blev Size MB Tng Profi R&D Exp Age 
Op. 
Risk 
                    
1 High NF Risk 0.46 4.84 1.24 0.31 0.03 0.04 0.25 2.40 0.12 
2 0.44 5.29 1.26 0.32 0.10 0.03 0.22 2.54 0.08 
3 0.44 5.62 1.27 0.34 0.11 0.02 0.20 2.60 0.07 
4 0.42 5.90 1.27 0.35 0.12 0.02 0.19 2.71 0.06 
5 0.41 6.04 1.30 0.36 0.12 0.02 0.18 2.79 0.05 
6 0.41 6.27 1.31 0.37 0.13 0.02 0.18 2.82 0.05 
7 0.40 6.47 1.34 0.36 0.13 0.01 0.18 2.93 0.05 
8 0.36 6.68 1.39 0.37 0.14 0.02 0.18 2.97 0.05 
9 0.34 6.88 1.40 0.36 0.14 0.02 0.17 3.09 0.04 
10 0.34 7.00 1.49 0.35 0.15 0.02 0.18 3.11 0.04 
11 0.32 7.15 1.48 0.36 0.16 0.02 0.18 3.21 0.04 
12 0.31 7.31 1.52 0.34 0.16 0.02 0.19 3.26 0.04 
13 0.30 7.50 1.57 0.33 0.16 0.02 0.19 3.32 0.04 
14 0.30 7.67 1.59 0.35 0.16 0.02 0.20 3.34 0.03 
15 0.30 7.90 1.68 0.33 0.17 0.02 0.19 3.44 0.03 
16 0.28 8.00 1.74 0.34 0.18 0.02 0.20 3.50 0.03 
17 0.26 8.28 1.80 0.35 0.19 0.02 0.20 3.53 0.03 
18 0.28 8.65 1.90 0.37 0.19 0.02 0.20 3.57 0.03 
19 0.27 8.95 2.17 0.37 0.20 0.03 0.22 3.60 0.03 















Panel B. Rated Firms - Medians 
NF Risk portfolio Blev Size MB Tng Profi R&D Exp Age 
Op. 
Risk 
                    
1 High NF Risk 0.46 4.86 1.14 0.24 0.04 0.00 0.20 2.32 0.10 
2 0.43 5.28 1.14 0.25 0.09 0.00 0.18 2.49 0.06 
3 0.43 5.57 1.14 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.17 2.54 0.05 
4 0.41 5.89 1.16 0.29 0.11 0.00 0.16 2.69 0.05 
5 0.39 6.04 1.21 0.32 0.12 0.00 0.15 2.79 0.04 
6 0.38 6.24 1.22 0.32 0.13 0.00 0.15 2.80 0.04 
7 0.37 6.45 1.22 0.32 0.13 0.00 0.16 2.95 0.04 
8 0.34 6.65 1.25 0.31 0.13 0.00 0.15 2.99 0.04 
9 0.32 6.85 1.28 0.30 0.13 0.00 0.15 3.10 0.04 
10 0.31 6.99 1.34 0.30 0.14 0.00 0.15 3.16 0.03 
11 0.29 7.14 1.36 0.30 0.15 0.00 0.16 3.30 0.03 
12 0.29 7.26 1.40 0.28 0.15 0.00 0.16 3.37 0.03 
13 0.27 7.42 1.41 0.28 0.15 0.00 0.16 3.44 0.03 
14 0.27 7.62 1.45 0.30 0.16 0.00 0.18 3.47 0.03 
15 0.28 7.84 1.51 0.29 0.17 0.00 0.18 3.63 0.03 
16 0.26 7.93 1.62 0.30 0.17 0.00 0.18 3.70 0.03 
17 0.25 8.27 1.60 0.31 0.17 0.00 0.17 3.71 0.03 
18 0.27 8.63 1.70 0.32 0.18 0.00 0.18 3.76 0.02 
19 0.25 8.98 1.91 0.33 0.20 0.01 0.21 3.80 0.02 



















Panel C. Unrated Firms - Means 
NF Risk 













                        
1 High NF Risk 0.20 1.63 1.54 0.18 -0.18 0.11 0.58 2.34 0.19 0.00 0.00 
2 0.20 2.11 1.47 0.19 -0.05 0.08 0.47 2.41 0.14 0.00 0.00 
3 0.20 2.42 1.46 0.21 -0.01 0.07 0.42 2.46 0.12 0.00 0.00 
4 0.20 2.70 1.51 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.39 2.48 0.11 0.00 0.00 
5 0.21 2.96 1.50 0.23 0.04 0.06 0.37 2.52 0.10 0.01 0.01 
6 0.21 3.18 1.51 0.24 0.06 0.06 0.36 2.53 0.09 0.01 0.01 
7 0.21 3.43 1.48 0.25 0.08 0.05 0.32 2.58 0.09 0.01 0.01 
8 0.21 3.64 1.51 0.25 0.09 0.05 0.31 2.58 0.08 0.02 0.01 
9 0.21 3.86 1.52 0.25 0.10 0.04 0.29 2.62 0.08 0.02 0.01 
10 0.22 4.07 1.55 0.26 0.11 0.04 0.29 2.62 0.08 0.03 0.02 
11 0.22 4.26 1.59 0.26 0.12 0.04 0.28 2.66 0.07 0.03 0.03 
12 0.21 4.45 1.62 0.27 0.13 0.04 0.27 2.67 0.07 0.04 0.03 
13 0.21 4.67 1.62 0.27 0.14 0.04 0.26 2.69 0.06 0.05 0.03 
14 0.21 4.87 1.65 0.28 0.15 0.03 0.26 2.75 0.06 0.06 0.03 
15 0.20 5.06 1.70 0.28 0.16 0.03 0.25 2.78 0.05 0.07 0.04 
16 0.20 5.31 1.76 0.29 0.17 0.03 0.24 2.80 0.05 0.07 0.05 
17 0.20 5.53 1.88 0.30 0.18 0.03 0.24 2.85 0.05 0.09 0.05 
18 0.18 5.82 2.00 0.31 0.20 0.03 0.24 2.93 0.05 0.09 0.06 
19 0.18 6.13 2.22 0.31 0.22 0.03 0.24 2.99 0.05 0.11 0.05 

















Panel D. Unrated Firms - Medians 
NF Risk portfolio Blev Size MB Tng Profi R&D Exp Age 
Op. 
Risk 
                    
1 High NF Risk 0.12 1.57 1.28 0.11 -0.15 0.05 0.51 2.30 0.18 
2 0.13 2.09 1.20 0.12 -0.04 0.02 0.40 2.36 0.13 
3 0.13 2.39 1.21 0.13 0.00 0.02 0.36 2.42 0.11 
4 0.14 2.73 1.22 0.14 0.03 0.02 0.33 2.45 0.10 
5 0.15 2.98 1.21 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.31 2.48 0.09 
6 0.16 3.19 1.22 0.17 0.07 0.01 0.30 2.49 0.08 
7 0.15 3.44 1.21 0.18 0.08 0.01 0.27 2.58 0.07 
8 0.16 3.63 1.22 0.18 0.09 0.01 0.26 2.56 0.07 
9 0.16 3.87 1.24 0.18 0.10 0.00 0.25 2.61 0.06 
10 0.18 4.10 1.24 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.24 2.60 0.06 
11 0.17 4.28 1.27 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.23 2.62 0.06 
12 0.17 4.47 1.31 0.21 0.12 0.00 0.23 2.64 0.06 
13 0.17 4.69 1.32 0.22 0.13 0.00 0.22 2.66 0.05 
14 0.17 4.89 1.34 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.22 2.74 0.05 
15 0.17 5.08 1.39 0.23 0.15 0.00 0.21 2.80 0.04 
16 0.16 5.33 1.45 0.24 0.16 0.00 0.21 2.84 0.04 
17 0.16 5.53 1.56 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.21 2.89 0.04 
18 0.14 5.84 1.67 0.26 0.18 0.00 0.21 2.97 0.04 
19 0.15 6.19 1.85 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.21 3.04 0.03 




















Leverage and NF_Risk - rated vs unrated 
 
The table reports the coefficient from regressing leverage on the NF_Risk measure in the sample of firms with and 
without a credit rating. The standard errors used to compute t-statistics (the latter reported in brackets) are robust 
to heteroskedasticity and clustering at the firm level. Coefficient estimates significantly different from zero at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level are identified with *, **, and ***, respectively. 


















the 2 lowest 
NF risk 
portfolios 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
              
NF Risk 0.0248*** 0.00122* 0.0261***  -0.00216*** 0.0275***  -0.00380*** 
  [20.34] [1.86] [18.57] [-3.03] [18.21] [-4.96]    
              
_cons 0.580*** 0.208*** 0.591*** 0.194*** 0.602*** 0.187*** 
  [48.26] [48.20] [44.43] [43.63] [43.11] [41.39]    
              
N 21443 67024 20387 63689 19314 60337 





















Figure 3.1 Coefficients on NF_Risk portfolio dummies 
The figure plots the coefficients from a regression of leverage on 50 portfolio indicators based on the NF_Risk 
measure. Each year the rated and unrated samples are split into 50 portfolios based on the measure of non-financial 
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